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outh Africa’s apartheid system ended in 1994. This monumental event 
stopped legally sanctioned racial segregation but left the country with one 
of the highest rates of income inequality of any nation in the world. This 
research monograph investigates how to develop human capital—through the 
education system and other avenues—to bring income equality to South Africa 
by preparing low-income groups to better contribute to economic growth. 
  This study by Futoshi Yamauchi investigates influences on human capital 
investment, the most prominent of which is the state of South African edu-
cation. By examining education policies and household behavior, Yamauchi 
arrives at two major findings. First, access to quality education is still unequal 
across different segments of the society. Black Africans continue to have 
lower-quality schooling than other racial groups. For this reason, providing 
subsidies to black African households and predominantly black African schools 
to relieve financial constraints is an urgent priority.
  Second, although education is at the center of human capital formation, 
such formation must go beyond the classroom. To guarantee the outcomes 
expected from the government’s efforts to develop public-school education, 
building human capital must start in early childhood—indeed, even before 
birth. South Africa needs policy interventions aimed at enhancing healthy child 
growth, such as the current child support grants. Another obstacle to public 
education improvements and human capital development is the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic. For many adolescents, educational progress stalls when HIV-infected 
parents cannot work, forcing students to leave school and enter the labor mar-
ket to support their families. The government should provide these households 
with support, thereby protecting children from negative impacts that may 
affect human capital development. 
  The formation of human capital will take time, but it is a more politically 
feasible method of promoting income equality than direct asset redistribution 
from the white African minority to the black African majority. Human capital 
formation can also be a longer-lasting and more sustainable way to promote 
income equality and overall economic growth. Investing in the human capital 
of a disadvantaged group builds new assets for that group, expanding the 
possibilities for South Africans struggling to emerge from the shadow of apart-
heid and for the country as a whole.
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T
his research monograph is based on findings originally presented in Yama-
uchi (2005b) (Chapter 2), Yamauchi (2010) (Chapter 3), Yamauchi (2008) 
(Chapter 4), and Yamauchi, Buthelezi, and Velia (2008) (Chapter 5).
  In Part 1, Chapter 2 presents evidence of changes in school quality in 
formerly white, colored, Indian/Asian, and African schools under the post-
apartheid regime in South Africa. The analysis uses the learner-educator ratio 
as a measure of school quality. It is shown that although we observe some con-
vergence in school quality, differences between formerly white and African 
schools are still significant. African schools are facing financial constraints in 
adjusting the number of teachers they can hire.
  Chapter 3 demonstrates spatial patterns among heterogeneous schools 
and population groups. In particular, formerly white schools, which are shown 
to have better school quality, are located in communities where whites are 
dominant. Formerly white schools also charge higher school fees, which may 
screen out children from disadvantaged backgrounds. School fees are posi-
tively correlated with school quality in South Africa. Interestingly, empirical 
results show that dominant population groups in the community and former 
education departments are still significant determinants of school fees (qual-
ity), although in metropolitan areas local economic factors are also becoming 
important.
  The second part of the chapter shows that both school fees and government 
subsidy increase the quality of education, decreasing the learner-educator 
ratio. In particular, an increase in government subsidy significantly increases 
the number of subsidized teachers. It is also found that government subsidy 
is allocated progressively to schools with initially poorer quality. The results 
imply that school fees can be decreased through an increase in government 
subsidy while maintaining school quality.
  In Part 2, Chapter 4 analyzes dynamic human capital production from 
the early-childhood to schooling stages using panel data. Healthy growth in 
early childhood, measured by height-for-age z-scores, significantly improves 
schooling investments and outcomes, decreases the age at which school is 
started, decreases grade repetitions, and increases progression. However, 
for larger children, this effect is weak, possibly showing that health capital 
may increase the opportunity cost for schooling. Comparing the results from 
xixii  SUMMARY
6- and 11-year panel data, we can also conclude that the positive effect of 
early-childhood growth on schooling diminishes at higher schooling stages.
  Chapter 5 addresses the effects of prime-age adult mortality on adoles-
cents’ transition from school to the labor market. First, we show that mor-
tality is concentrated in prime-age adults. There are two types of responses 
to prime-age adult deaths: ex ante and ex post. Deaths of prime-age adults 
significantly increase both male and female adolescents’ labor force partici-
pation as they stop their schooling. Second, the death of prime-age adults in 




uman capital is a general notion of the knowledge and skills embod-
ied in human beings, which plays an important role in determining 
their labor productivity (Schultz 1961; Becker 1962) and their ability 
to absorb new knowledge and master new technologies (Schultz 1975).
  Human capital formation takes different forms and passes through vari-
ous stages in parallel with the human life cycle. The core of human capital 
formation is acquisition of new knowledge and skills. There is no doubt in 
modern societies that education plays an important role in this central activ-
ity. However, since knowledge and skills are embodied in human beings, it is 
also hard to separate them from human health, which also determines labor 
productivity (for example, Strauss and Thomas 1995). Moreover, the inter-
action of human beings also affects knowledge spillovers in a society (Romer 
1986; Lucas 1988). Therefore, the way in which the society is structured is 
crucial to the formation of human capital.
  Formation starts before childbirth, when parents’ decisions and behavior 
determine birth outcomes. Child growth affects outcomes during schooling 
(for example, Alderman et al. 2000), which subsequently influence labor 
market outcomes. It takes a long time to form human capital.
  The fact that human capital is embodied in human beings implies that it 
can directly improve the earning capability of the poor. Human capital can 
contribute to greater equity in a society by directly changing the earning 
capability of those who have little access to physical and financial resources. 
Publicly funded education is one of the most important means of building 
human capital among the poor, who tend to be credit constrained for private 
investments in education. In this sense, human capital investment through 
public education is essentially open to the majority in many societies.
  The accumulation of human capital is also a basis for economic growth. In 
many economies that have experienced successful economic growth, the accu-
mulation of human capital either preceded the growth path, was an important 
component that explained growth, or both (Hayami and Godo 2005). Comple-
mentarities between human and physical capital in the economy lead to the 
1acceleration of further investments in human and physical capital in the long 
run (Lucas 1988). The experiences in Asian economies show that human capital 
is one of many critical factors that can enhance economic growth with equity 
(World Bank 1993).
  This monograph describes challenges and possibilities in the formation of 
human capital in South Africa. The country experienced apartheid until the 
mid-1990s. Given the difficulty in directly redistributing assets and wealth from 
the historically advantaged minority to the majority, the broad formation 
of human capital in the population—especially access to quality education 
among the majority Africans—appears to be able to provide more opportuni-
ties to the majority of Africans and to have the potential to improve equity 
in the country.1
Why Human Capital Is Important in South Africa
This monograph highlights the issues surrounding human capital formation 
in South Africa. Apartheid resulted in segregation and discrimination against 
the majority African population in almost all aspects of social life, such as 
education, employment, and residence. As part of apartheid, Africans were 
deprived of both physical and human assets, being forced to live on infertile 
land or in urban townships, and of the rights of citizenship and political par-
ticipation, particularly the right to vote.2
  Since 1994 the South African government has promised to implement policies 
to help the majority of Africans to gain lost opportunities. However, since the 
redistribution of assets from the minority whites to the majority Africans has 
been politically challenging, the country has also taken more gradual measures 
to improve equity, without adversely affecting its economic performance.
  In the area of public education, the government of South Africa formally 
terminated school segregation laws, but realities for African learners did not 
improve greatly (see Chapters 2 and 3). The government introduced the South 
African School Act (Republic of South Africa 1996a, 1996b) and the Norms and 
Standards for School Funding (Republic of South Africa 1998) to provide guid-
ance in implementing a nonsegregated education system. Under apartheid, 
segregated schools were governed by racially separate government agencies 
according to their classification both by population groups (white, colored, 
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1 This process could create inequalities among Africans during the transition period, when more 
high-quality schools are introduced to the African population. However, given the current gap 
in the quality of schools available to the races, especially whites and Africans, the above-
mentioned change is expected to narrow the gap in earnings in the labor market.
2 Even before apartheid, Africans had been in an inferior situation for years. However, system-
atic legal structures that segregated and discriminated against Africans were enforced under 
apartheid.Indian/Asian or African) and into independent and nonindependent home-
lands (see Chapter 2). In the post-apartheid regime, discriminatory and seg-
regating barriers that prevented African children from entering other schools 
were discontinued. Yet in reality schools attended primarily by white children 
have maintained their superior quality over those attended by Africans. In 
spite of institutional reform, economic and spatial divides between whites 
and others have not changed significantly, and this reality is reflected in the 
education system. It is an urgent challenge to guarantee Africans access to 
quality education in the public system.3
  Among the nations of the world, South Africa is ranked among the highest 
in terms of income inequality; its Gini coefficient is around 0.6. Given the 
difficulty in redistributing physical and financial assets, such as land, to Afri-
cans by drastic means, the formation of human capital in majority Africans 
appears to be one of the most feasible methods for improving equity in the 
society.4 Regarding returns to education, the next section discusses features 
specific to the South African labor markets.
  Human capital has several unique features. First, as already discussed, 
human capital directly improves individual earning capacity. Therefore, the 
formation of human capital among Africans would be expected to increase 
their earnings.
  Second, through the public education system, the government is expected 
to progressively help the poor. Equal access to quality education plays a cru-
cial role in guaranteeing this outcome.
  Third, social returns are often larger than private returns. Externalities 
may arise from the accumulation of human capital in an economy, with human 
capital embodied in certain individuals augmenting that in others. This effect 
may also enhance the performance of the economy over the long run.
  Fourth, and most importantly, the formation of human capital in a dis-
advantaged group builds new assets for that group. This strategy is entirely 
different from the redistribution of assets, in which certain assets are forcibly
taken away from their owners. To secure equity in a society, a human-capital-
based strategy is much less politically sensitive than one based on asset 
redistribution.5 However, this strategy also has costs regarding the time that 
may be required for human capital investment to have an impact. It often 
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3 This problem is different from that addressed by affirmative action, which seeks to guarantee 
equal opportunities to a minority group within a population.
4 In the author’s opinion, the inheritance tax should be systematically reformed so as to reduce 
nonlabor income components inheritable from the present generation to future generations. 
This channel will also increase the market supply of inheritable assets.
5 A good example of the latter strategy is provided by Indonesia, where by presidential order oil 
surpluses in the 1970s were used to construct schools on a massive scale.needs a rather long gestation period. For example, school education up to 
the completion of high school requires 12 years. This factor also implies that 
the expected improvement of equity and income distribution takes a rather 
long time.
  Human capital investment needs time input, which implies opportunity 
cost at the individual level. Individuals need to indirectly pay the cost, forgo-
ing earning opportunities that are available during the period they invest in 
human capital.
Returns to Education in South Africa
This section provides evidence on the returns to schooling in South African 
labor markets. Since I do not cover labor market issues in the main analysis, 
it is important to briefly discuss the functioning of labor markets and point 
out unique features of the markets in South Africa.
  High unemployment is one key feature of the South African labor markets. 
Kingdon and Knight (2006) estimate that, in the period between 2002 and 
2005, the unemployment rate was holding at 40 percent.
  Several studies provide evidence on returns to schooling in the South Afri-
can labor markets using micro data (see Bhorat et al. 2001). Though racial 
gaps in returns to schooling have been narrowed, lower returns among Afri-
cans are attributed to grade repetition and the lower quality of the schools 
available to them (for example, Anderson, Case, and Lam 2001).
  One interesting aspect of the data on schooling returns is their convexity. 
Education up to the high school level does not contribute to employment, but 
tertiary-level education significantly increases the probability of employment 
(Bhorat et al. 2001), thus creating convexity in the earning profile. This find-
ing is similar to reports from the Philippines (Yamauchi 2005a).
  The effect of heterogeneity in school quality on labor market outcomes is 
important in South Africa. For example, Case and Yogo (1999) attempted to 
quantify the effect of school quality on labor market earnings in South Africa, 
merging data from population censuses and school censuses.6 On this point, it 
is worth noting that the matriculation pass rate at high school graduation is 
generally low in South Africa, having decreased from 70 percent in 2004 to 65 
percent in 2007. This means that even if children officially finish high school, 
they are not qualified based on measures of educational accomplishment. 
The problem is particularly severe in rural areas where schools are located in 
predominantly African communities.
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6 Case and Deaton (1999) examined the effect of school quality on learner performance.  The September 2003 Labor Force Survey (LFS) reveals some basic features 
of the South African labor markets, with special attention to returns to school-
ing. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the distributions of years of schooling completed 
for age groups 15–39 and 40–64 in the LFS sample.
  These graphs demonstrate the convergence of educational attainment 
across population groups over cohorts. The distribution among whites has been 
constant between the age groups. Note the large increase in schooling attain-
ment among younger cohorts in the Indian/Asian group, enabling the distribu-
tion for that group to be nearly equivalent to that of whites. Though increases 
in completed schooling are observed in the African and colored groups, the 
average level is far below the levels of whites and Indian/Asians.
























Figure 1.1  Years of schooling completed: Ages 15–39
Source:   Republic of South Africa, Statistics South Africa (2003).  I estimate returns to schooling using both employment and log monthly 
wage equations. The employment equations show determinants of employ-
ment, while the wage equations estimate the effects of schooling on monthly 
earnings using the population of employed persons. Combining results from 
both equations, we can determine how schooling affects the likelihood of 
being employed and the salaries paid to the employed.
  As is well known and has been discussed in various studies (for example, 
Card 2001), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of returns to schooling 
could be biased because of correlations between years of schooling and 
unobserved fixed error components, omitted determinants, or both. Since 
























Figure 1.2  Years of schooling completed: Ages 40–64
Source:   Republic of South Africa, Statistics South Africa (2003).individual ability (augmenting the wage) and schooling attainment are posi-
tively correlated, our estimates are likely to be biased upward.7
  Moreover, school quality and family background (neither of which is 
directly observable) affect schooling attainment and income levels. In the 
current context, they are both correlated with population groups: whites still 
have persistently better access to high-quality schools and enjoy more family 
resources than the other groups, particularly Africans. Therefore it is impor-
tant to control for population groups to minimize potential bias in estimating 
returns to schooling.
 Columns  1–3 in Table 1.1 summarize estimation results for the employ-
ment equation.8 Schooling significantly increases the probability of having 
work (column 1), but it only increases the probability if high school or a higher 
level is attained (column 2). Educational attainment up to grade 12 does not 
significantly contribute to the likelihood of being employed in South Africa.
  Column 3 includes the interaction of population group indicators and years 
of schooling. Whites have an advantage in getting employment, and Indian/
Asians have a disadvantage regardless of schooling, compared to Africans. 
However, returns to schooling are significantly higher among coloreds and 
Indian/Asians than Africans.
  Chapter 5 presents empirical evidence on transitions among adolescents 
from school to the labor market, highlighting the impacts of prime-age adult 
mortality. Many adolescents who quit school do not find jobs in the labor 
market (increasing the labor supply in the labor force).
  Similar findings are confirmed by the wage equations (columns 4–6). One 
interesting finding is that, compared to Africans, whites earn higher wages 
regardless of schooling, and Indian/Asians demonstrate higher returns to 
schooling. It is also confirmed that schooling up to completion of high school 
does not contribute to monthly wage.
  These findings demonstrated heterogeneity in returns to schooling in both 
the employment and wage equations, but they also pose two as yet unresolved 
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7 In the empirical setting and for the data used in the estimation of returns to schooling, it is 
difficult to find valid instruments or exogenous variations in years of schooling (schooling attain-
ment). Schooling attainment increased in the recent cohorts, especially among Africans after 
1994, but in the post-apartheid regime the change occurred simultaneously with changes in the 
labor markets, such as employment opportunities formerly restricted to whites being opened to 
Africans.
8 The employment indicator takes the value of one if an individual works in some capacity and 
zero otherwise. I dropped from the sample those who did not look for work within the past 
seven days because they are currently learners, housewives (homemakers), retired (prefer not 
to seek work), ill, disabled, too young, or too old. The indicator takes a value of one if the indi-
vidual is guaranteed work in the near future.8  CHAPTER 1
Table 1.1  Returns to schooling in South Africa, ages 15–64 years, 
Labor Force Survey, September 2003
  Employment  Log monthly wage
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
Years of schooling  0.0178    0.0083  0.1357    0.1097
  (5.91)   (4.85)  (18.08)   (15.25)
  ×  Colored    0.0185    0.0248
     (3.55)     (1.46)
  ×  Indian/Asian    0.0312    0.0532
     (11.57)     (2.53)
  ×  White    0.0019    0.0095
     (0.59)     (1.24)
Colored     –0.0329     0.1096
     (0.57)     (0.84)
Indian/Asian     –0.1717     0.0065
     (6.42)     (0.04)
White    0.2582    0.9752
     (5.31)     (10.07)
Year 1    –0.0338     0.1226
   (0.70)     (2.32)
Year 2    –0.0014     0.1356
   (0.06)     (2.23)
Year  3   0.0166     0.1606
   (1.05)     (3.53)
Year  4   0.0065     0.1685
   (0.40)     (2.95)
Year 5    –0.0061     0.2124
   (0.47)     (7.88)
Year  6   0.0186     0.2976
   (1.74)     (7.18)
Year  7   0.0017     0.3218
   (0.10)     (6.89)
Year  8   0.0049     0.4282
   (0.33)     (7.93)
Year  9   0.0216     0.5214
   (1.82)     (8.31)
Year  10   0.0414     0.7272
   (3.15)      (10.83)
Year 11    –0.0130     0.7513
   (1.13)      (13.86)
Year  12   0.1563     1.4433
   (9.59)      (22.53)
Year  13   0.1845     1.4197
   (4.18)     (6.29)
Year  14   0.1805     1.6086
   (2.93)     (4.81)
Year  15   0.2052     1.8933
   (7.02)      (16.21)
Year  16   0.3340     2.378
   (11.56)    (53.32)
Year  18   0.3207     2.5292
   (9.25)      (33.38)questions. First, what creates differences in the returns to schooling? One 
important missing factor is the quality of education, which may substantially 
differ across schools, possibly correlated with historical backgrounds and local 
school and community conditions. This issue is examined in depth in Chapters 
2 and 3.
  Second, why do returns to schooling show convexity? Investments in school-
ing below the high school level do not help individuals find jobs, nor does 
increasing wages in the labor market. Yamauchi (2005a) shows similar findings 
from the Philippines. This issue is not directly addressed in this monograph.
Approach: School System and Household Behavior
The approach taken in this monograph is twofold. First, we try to understand 
institutional factors that constrain the formation of human capital. In this 
respect, the school system is the most important factor within the context of 
South Africa, where the regime transformed from segregation under apart-
heid to democracy in the mid-1990s. Unless we understand which institutional 
and historical factors determine the constraints imposed on microeconomic 
behavior in human capital investment, it is difficult to correctly interpret 
findings from household-level analysis.
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Table 1.1  Continued
  Employment  Log monthly wage
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
Age  0.0481 0.0469  0.0489  0.7971 0.0812  0.0907
  (11.33) (10.98)  (11.25)  (10.44) (12.28)  (12.83)
Age squared  –0.0004  –0.0004  –0.0005  –0.0007  –0.0008  –0.0009
  (7.75) (7.58)  (7.70)  (7.89) (9.59) (10.14)
Male  0.1087 0.1073  0.1045  0.4839 0.5019  0.4844
 (9.10)  (9.49)  (8.90)  (15.16)  (15.70)  (18.14)
Province ×  urban/rural  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
Number of observations  42,688  42,688  42,688  15,551  15,551  15,551
R2  0.1921 0.2056  0.2189  0.3933 0.4520  0.4601
Source:   Republic of South Africa, Statistics South Africa (2003).
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values, using robust standard errors with sample 
stratum clusters (province including both urban and rural areas). The employment indica-
tor equals one if an individual worked in some capacity and zero otherwise. The employ-
ment indicator equals one if an individual worked in some capacity and zero otherwise. 
Those who did not look for work within the seven days preceding the survey because they 
were students or housewives (homemakers) or were retired (preferred not to seek work), 
ill, disabled, too young, or too old were dropped from the sample. The indicator has a 
value of one if the individual was guaranteed work in the near future. Data for college 
graduates and postgraduates were converted into years 16 and 18, respectively.  Second, we analyze household behavior related to human capital invest-
ment. In this area, we focus on dynamic human capital production, from early-
childhood nutrition intake to schooling investments and attainment, and on 
adolescents’ transition to the labor market. Even at this stage of the analy-
sis, it is important to integrate institutional factors and observed household 
behavior to achieve a comprehensive understanding.
  In South Africa, access to quality education is still highly unequal across 
population groups and locations, although the situation has been changing. 
In the transition from apartheid to a democratic education system, two 
milestones stand out: the 1996 South African School Act and the 1998 Norms 
and Standards for School Funding. These two sets of rules provided basic 
guidelines to departments of education at the national and provincial levels. 
More recently, South Africa introduced a revised set of Norms and Standards 
to promote more progressive fiscal interventions in the school system.
  As described in Part 1, however, there still remain discrepancies in 
access to quality education across population groups and communities (where 
population groups remain locally clustered). To understand institutional con-
straints, the two key dimensions are introduced.
  The first dimension is population groups. Historically there have been four 
politically defined population groups in the country: white, colored, Indian/
Asian, and African. The majority of the population is African. Under apartheid, 
Africans had semiautonomous homelands where they governed and received 
almost no support from the white central government. Public schools were 
also governed by different education ministries that were separated by popu-
lation group and homeland. It has been important to investigate the conver-
gence in access to quality education across population groups.
  The second dimension is location. Since population groups were segre-
gated in residential locations under apartheid, their schools were also
segregated by location. For example, African schools were located in pre-
dominantly African communities. Therefore access to quality education has 
a spatial dimension. Since commuting long distances to school is not possible 
for many children owing to the substantial financial and time costs involved, 
accessibility to good schools depends on their spatial distribution (and on 
changes to that distribution, given past conditions).
  In Part 2 findings on household behavior using micro panel data are 
reported. In particular, this part examines the dynamic nature of human 
capital investments and formation, from early-childhood growth (nutrition 
intake), to schooling investments, to adolescents’ transition to the labor mar-
ket. Chapter 4 focuses on dynamic human capital production in which early-
stage investment can have long-term implications for schooling outcomes 
(and therefore potentially labor market outcomes).
10  CHAPTER 1  In the analysis of school-to-market transition, it is important to note that 
South Africa has suffered from unusually high levels of unemployment (or 
underemployment), which makes the transition from school to labor markets 
quite difficult (see also results in Table 1.1). Individuals, while in the labor 
force, do not necessarily transition to employment. In Chapter 5 I identify 
the impacts of prime-adult mortality, prevalent in recent years because of 
HIV/AIDS, on adolescent labor supply behavior under circumstances in which 
completion of high school or higher-level schooling significantly increases the 
likelihood of being employed.
  This shock might have affected human capital formation by reducing 
parental inputs to child schooling and increasing the need for school-age indi-
viduals to look for work. Perceived returns to human capital investment (for 
example, schooling) may also be altered owing to an increase in prime-age 
adult mortality.
Data Sources
School and Population Census
The analysis in Part 1 uses three datasets: (1) School Register of Needs (SRN) 
1996 and 2000, (2) Annual School Surveys (School Census), (3) Census 2001 
Community Profile (with geographic information system [GIS] data), and (4) 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education School Finance data. The SRN and 
Annual School Surveys comprise census data on schools. The former has quite 
detailed information on school facilities, while the latter is more general, 
containing information on learners and school finance.
  In the analysis of the spatial distribution of school quality and population 
groups (Chapter 3), I also use the Community Profile Database in the 2001 
population census. Since GIS information is available in both school censuses, 
it was possible to merge the population census and school census data by 
location. In addition, I use government subsidy data provided by the KwaZulu-
Natal Department of Education to analyze the effect of such subsidies on 
school quality. Details on school data are supplied in Chapters 2 and 3.
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics, Rounds 2 and 3
In the analysis of household behavior, I rely on the KwaZulu-Natal Income 
Dynamics Study (KIDS), rounds 2 and 3, conducted in 1998 and 2004, respec-
tively.9 The data were collected in the province of KwaZulu-Natal in 1993 
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9 The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study was a collaborative project between researchers 
at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the 
University of Wisconsin, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the Norwegianduring surveys for the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Develop-
ment (PSLSD) by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit. 
Though spatial coverage is restricted to the province, these are unique panel 
data that started before the transition from apartheid to democracy.10
  KIDS involved three rounds: round 1 in 1993, round 2 in 1998, and round 3 in 
2004. Compilation of the dataset, which is focused on the gathering of income 
and expenditure data via a detailed questionnaire, followed the national PSLSD, 
which was carried out across South Africa in 1993 and managed by the World 
Bank. As such, KIDS round 1 is a geographic subset of households from the 
national survey, with colored and white households excluded from follow-up.
  The sampling frame for the 1993 national survey was based on a two-stage 
self-weighting design. The 1991 Census Enumerator Subdistrict (or an equiva-
lent unit such as a village or village group) was the first-stage unit; systematic 
sampling was then applied to households within that unit during the second 
sampling stage (see South African Labour and Development Research Unit 
1994 for further details).
  In 2004 data were collected for 1,426 African and Indian/Asian households 
across 68 (rural and urban) “clusters” in KwaZulu-Natal; 867 households 
interviewed contained key decisionmakers in 1993 (see May et al. 2007 for 
further details on the survey). In round 3 information was collected on about 
65 percent of the 1998 household members.11
  The 2004 survey in particular collected some retrospective information 
on child schooling, such as repetitions and school-start age. Combining these 
data with anthropometry measures for 1993 and 1998, I can analyze dynamic 
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Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, and the South African Department of Social Develop-
ment. In addition to support from these institutions, the following organizations provided finan-
cial support: the Department for International Development South Africa (DFID-SA), the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the 
National Research Foundation Norwegian Research Council, through a grant to the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal.
10 More recent panel data from the country include: four rounds of the Cape Area Panel Study, 
a longitudinal study of the lives of youths and young adults in metropolitan Cape Town (see 
www.caps.uct.ac.za for details), two demographic surveillance sites providing annually col-
lected panel data on 11,000 households in Limpopo province since the early 1990s (Agincourt 
Health and Population Unit), and twice-yearly panel data on 11,000 households in KwaZulu-Natal 
since 2000 (Africa Centre for Health and Population Studies).
11 May et al. (2007) describe the methodology of the KIDS survey and its history. They show that 
the follow-up rate was comparatively high for women (relative to men) and for those less than 20 
years old in 1998, as these subgroups are comparatively less mobile than other groups. They note 
that there may have been problems of representativity from round 1. Nevertheless they show 
that the age distribution, sex ratio, and change by age in the sex ratio of household members 
(including the children of core household members who were tracked at times outside KwaZulu-
Natal) in 2004 are generally representative of the trends for the province when set against the 
2001 census data. Children 10–14 years old are overrepresented in KIDS, while younger adults are 
underrepresented; the authors provide detailed explanation for these situations.human capital formation from early-childhood to school stages (Chapter 4). In 
the analysis in Chapter 4, I also use some information from the 1993 survey.
  In the analysis of adolescent transition from school to the labor market 
(Chapter 5), I use prime-age adult deaths as external shocks to adolescents 
who change the timing of their entrance into the labor force. In the period 
from 1998 to 2004, South Africa (and KwaZulu-Natal in particular) experi-
enced a high prime-age mortality rate. In the face of increased prime-age 
adult mortality, human behavior has been changed to mitigate its adverse 
impacts.12
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art 1 describes the school system in post-apartheid South Africa. The 
focus is on quality gaps across schools, which have been persistent since 
the time of apartheid. Chapter 2 analyzes differences in school qual-
ity, measured by the learner-educator ratio, across former white, colored, 
Indian/Asian, and African schools, using school census data. Chapter 3 exam-
ines school fees, which are also indicative of school quality in a system in 
which schools and communities must raise needed resources; the findings 
demonstrate that school quality is spatially correlated with residential pat-
terns of different population groups. It is also shown that government subsidy 
can improve school quality and lower school fees. From both analyses, we 
conclude that financial constraints seem still to be binding at both the school 
and community levels in South Africa.CHAPTER 2
Race, Equity, and Public Schools in the First Decade 
of Post-Apartheid South Africa
I
n the transition from apartheid to a democratic society in South Africa 
after the first democratic national election in 1994, the government 
promised to provide equal opportunities for education to all racial groups 
and regions (Republic of South Africa 1996a, 1996b). However, as reported 
in Education Atlas of South Africa (Bot, Wilson, and Dove 2000), there still 
exist wide variations in major indicators of educational quality across regions. 
Given the clustered spatial distribution of racial groups in the country, it is 
not difficult to infer variations in educational opportunities among children 
across different population groups. In this chapter, I use South African school 
census data from 1996 and 2000 to assess variations in educational quality 
of public schools across former population groups and investigate changes in 
post-apartheid South Africa.
  It has been recognized both inside and outside South Africa that under 
apartheid (over which the African population had no control) African schools—
for example, those in the former homelands—were totally inferior to white 
schools in terms of funding (Kriege et al. 1994; Marais 1995; Crouch 1996). 
Differences in conditions between African and non-African schools led to 
corresponding differences in learner achievement, particularly examination 
scores in numeracy (Case and Deaton 1999). Unless the government actively 
strengthens its support of former African schools in terms of budget and 
personnel allocations, in order to narrow apartheid-created differences in 
educational quality, a vicious cycle of poverty and low-quality education will 
persist. Children who cannot receive a sufficiently high quality of education 
are less likely to be engaged in regular employment and are therefore more 
likely to remain in the low-income class (for example, Case and Yogo 1999). 
Since they cannot afford to live in well-off residential areas (in many cases, 
former white areas), which typically have high-quality schools, they are likely 
to stay in areas with inferior schools. When high residential rents prohibit 
access to better schools, this cycle will persist, potentially becoming a crucial 
determinant of the long-term poverty trap for Africans in the country.
17  To study gaps in educational quality across population groups, I focus on 
the ratio of learners to educators (teachers and other staff)—the learner-
educator ratio (LER)—from two school censuses, SRN 1996 and 2000. In 1995 
the government reached an agreement that ratios of 40:1 and 35:1 were to 
be achieved for primary and secondary schools, respectively, in the next five 
years. Therefore, LER can provide a good indicator not only of the distribu-
tion of education quality but also of the government’s policy interventions to 
achieve educational equity.
  Recent empirical work shows significant effects of LER and class size 
on learner achievement, although the literature as a whole contains some 
ambiguity (Hanushek 1998). The difficulty in identifying causality arises from 
potential endogeneity in the number of learners and unobserved fixed com-
ponents specific to school and community, which is likely to be correlated 
with school inputs.1 For example, Lazear (2001) argues that the effect of LER 
on learner achievement could be empirically ambiguous because of (often 
unobserved) heterogeneity in learner quality, that is, discipline. In his model, 
the optimal size of a class (LER) increases if learner discipline improves,
since the probability of disruption in a classroom decreases. To avoid such a
correlation between LER and unobservables, recent studies use exogenous 
variations (changes) in LER and class size to identify the effect on learner 
achievement (for example, Angrist and Lavy 1999; Case and Deaton 1999; 
Krueger 1999; Hoxby 2000). In these studies with exogenous variations in LER, 
the effect is found to be significant. In the context of South Africa, Case and 
Deaton (1999) show that among Africans under apartheid who were not free 
to choose schools, LER has a significant effect on learner achievement, par-
ticularly in numeracy, while its effect is not significant among whites.
  Table 2.1 compares means of LERs by population groups in both 1996 and 
2000. A striking fact evident from the table is that the gap between formerly 
African and white schools did not narrow during the period. Formerly white 
schools maintained their superior situation in the post-apartheid period. 
Though more detailed statistical analysis is provided in the section on empiri-
cal findings, the difference between formerly African and white schools 
seems persistent and stable.
  The LER gaps can have long-term implications. For instance, school qual-
ity matters in subsequent labor market outcomes (Card and Krueger 1996; 
Case and Yogo 1999; Dustman, Rajah, and Soest 2003). Based on Case and 
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1 High LERs are partly attributed to high grade repetition rates in South Africa. However, those 
who have repeated grades are more likely to transition to labor markets (Yamauchi 2003, using 
data from the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study).Yogo’s estimates of the impact of LER on returns to schooling investments,
for example, the marginal effect of LER on rate of return is around 0.002.
The mean LER gap between formerly African and white primary schools, 
10.060 in 1996 (Table 2.1), is equivalent to a reduction of 0.0201 in the rate 
of returns. The reduction is substantial because the average rate of return 
was 0.089–0.094 for men age 24–28 in 1996. Thus we can infer that inequality 
in educational opportunities (that is, gaps in LER) is transformed into inequal-
ity in labor market earning opportunities in South Africa.2
  The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section sets up 
a simple framework in which liquidity constraint is highlighted. The follow-
ing section describes the data that I use in the analysis, SRN 1996 and 2000. 
The surveys focus particularly on school facility information, in addition to 
basic information such as the numbers of educators and learners.3 To identify 
the former racial groups of those schools, SRN 2000 provides information 
on the departments that governed the schools under apartheid. Therefore, 
merging the two surveys, I can systematically track former apartheid depart-
ments. I exclude from the analysis of the sample the provinces of Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape since they changed school registration codes 
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Table 2.1  Learner-educator ratios by population group, 1996 and 2000
Population group  African  White  Colored  Indian/Asian  New schools
Primary school
  1996  36.211  26.151  28.736  27.753  39.673
  2000  31.465  25.790  29.996  32.806  40.833
Secondary school
  1996  31.975  22.329  23.196  23.415  38.145
  2000  31.052  24.203  30.157  30.447  35.996
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Note:   Sample means are shown by population group.
2 Yamauchi (2003) shows that grade repetition increases the probability of transition from school 
to labor market in South Africa and that it adversely affects employment probability, particu-
larly for men. Other conditions being equal, grade repetition is positively correlated with LER, 
as more learners remain enrolled longer.
3 However, the SRN lacks information on financial conditions and learner performance. In recent 
years, the Annual School Surveys have started collecting information on school facilities. In 
previous studies using SRN 1996, Bot, Wilson, and Dove (2000) completed a districtwise charac-
terization of school environments from various perspectives. The National Department of Educa-
tion (2002) conducted a provincial-level characterization of SRN 1996 and 2000 and described 
dynamic changes in South African education. In these studies, however, the data were not ana-
lyzed statistically.(Education Management Information Systems [EMIS] codes) after 1996, pre-
venting an accurate merge of the 1994 and 2000 datasets.4
  In the section on empirical findings we see, first, that the LER distribu-
tion for formerly African schools differs from that of formerly white, colored, 
Indian/Asian, and new schools in both 1996 and 2000. In particular, the dif-
ference between formerly African schools and white or Indian/Asian schools 
was found to be statistically significant. A large number of formerly African 
schools exhibit LERs above the targets set by the government: 40:1 and 35:1 
for primary and secondary schools, respectively.
  To identify how the number of educators was adjusted in response to 
changes in the number of learners, the estimation strategy takes into account 
community-school-level unobserved fixed components, using specifications 
drawn directly from the model in the appendix. First, the adjustments of edu-
cators in responding to changes in the number of learners (with budget con-
straints) differ statistically across racial groups in primary schools, especially 
the adjustments of subsidized educators. Formerly African schools are more 
budget (liquidity) constrained than non-African (white, colored, and Indian/
Asian) schools when they employ educators. Second, among secondary schools, 
the gaps are smaller than those found in primary schools. Interestingly, for-
merly white secondary schools do not show any significant adjustments to 
changes in the number of learners during this period, probably because their 
condition was already optimal. Third, in combined schools (both primary and 
secondary levels), the gaps between formerly African and Indian/Asian or 
new schools are significant. This observation reflects the fact that combined 
schools are regionally concentrated in certain districts and that there are 
few formerly white schools of this type. Fourth, in the analysis restricted 
to nonsubsidized (privately employed) educators, the number of educators 
does not significantly respond to changes in the number of learners. In this 




I factor out possible reasons for changes in the number of learners. First, 
natural population growth contributes to cohort size, and therefore the 
number of school-age children in a community. Second, after the abolition 
of apartheid, households could freely migrate from formerly African areas to 
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4 Since its population size is large, exclusion of Gauteng may potentially affect our results.white areas. Third, parents can send their children to live with distant family 
members or foster in other children, or children can go to private schools that 
formerly belonged to different population groups, even though these schools 
are not located in their residential areas.5
  In response to cross-sectional differences as well as changes in the num-
ber of learners in public schools, it is desirable to adjust the number of edu-
cators optimally to maintain efficiency in learning and equity among children. 
There are several scenarios. Consider a stationary environment in which 
the total number of learners does not change. If the provincial government 
coordinates the employment of teachers and allocates them among schools 
with no transaction costs, the optimal ratio of learners to educators can be 
smoothly maintained. The ratios will be equalized across schools.
  If schools have discretion over the employment of educators indepen-
dently of the local government (for example, principals decide to employ 
teachers with the approval of school governing bodies consisting of commu-
nity leaders, parents, and educators), the adjustment of educators depends 
on decisionmaking in each school and mostly on its financial condition. 
Currently in South Africa, many public schools receive insufficient financial 
support from the government. In this case, equalization of the ratios is not 
guaranteed. In other words, the equalization of LERs is a necessary condition 
for, among other things, unitary decisionmaking (or interventions) by the 
government. Even if the local government suffers budget constraints, unitary 
decisionmaking will lead to the equalization of LERs.
  In response to changes in the number of learners, budget constraints may 
matter at the school and government levels. Without population growth, 
under unitary decisionmaking by the government it is easy to transfer edu-
cators from one school to another to equalize ratios across schools. This is 
especially important under the post-apartheid regime, in which people are 
essentially free to migrate. With population growth, however, to maintain 
the current LER, the adjustment of educators (like the adjustment of capital 
stock) depends on the government’s budget (liquidity) constraint, since the 
government needs new educators.
  When public schools receive little or no government subsidy, the situation 
is more serious. Schools with binding budget constraints that cannot collect 
enough school fees from learner households are likely to have great difficulty 
in hiring more educators. Unlike with unitary decisionmaking, there will be 
more variations in LER across schools in this case, since financial conditions 
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5 Zimmerman (2003) shows that fostering raises school enrollment in South Africa. The geo-
graphic movement of children is partly motivated by the attempt to provide them with better 
educational opportunities.are likely to be different between schools. As a result, for quasi-privatized 
and budget-constrained public schools, LERs could have wide variations in 
cross-section as well as time series. The appendix presents a simple model 
that formalizes this idea.
Empirical Specification, Identification, and Estimation
In the empirical analysis, I estimate a response function of educators to learn-
ers taking into account school budget condition:
  Hit = [I(y* > φit)β* + I(y* < φit)γit(p)]Lit + μi + εit, (2.1)
where β* ≥ γit(p), p denotes population group, and μi is the fixed effect that 
reflects unobserved school- and community-specific components. I(y* > φit) 
means that the school is not budget constrained, while I(y* < φit) means that 
it is budget constrained. In the latter case, adjustment of educators is lower 
than the optimal. The derivation of γit(p) is given in the appendix. Here local 
condition f is also represented by population group p. Since, in the analysis 
using the SRN, the information on subsidies and school fees is not available, 
I assume the patterns according to which these two variables are determined 
differ across population groups. I estimate γit(p) as a reduced-form parameter 
in the estimation of (2.1).
  In equation (2.1), as in many cross-sectional studies, it is likely that the 
number of learners is correlated with the unobserved fixed component μi, 
which will bias the OLS estimate of the slope. For example, in communities 
experiencing rapid urbanization, where teachers can easily commute from 
urban centers and learners can migrate to them, the numbers of learners and 
educators will increase simultaneously. In this case, OLS estimates are biased 
upwardly. Assuming that parameters do not change over the four years, after 
conditioning on cross-group differences, we difference them between two 
periods:
  ΔHi∈p = Σγi(p)ΔLi∈p + Δεi, (2.2)
  p
where Δ is the differencing operator. The shocks are assumed to be ex post 
in each period.
  The parameter of interest represents the degree of liquidity constraint. As 
we will see in the section “Distribution Comparison,” the empirical distribu-
tions of LER motivate the analysis of determinants for the observed LER gaps 
across population groups. However, naive comparisons of LER distributions 
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educators changes in response to changes in the number of learners—and how 
likely liquidity constraint is to be binding in adjusting the number of educators. 
Changes in the number of learners represent fundamental changes in schools or 
the government that lead to adjustment in the number of educators.6
  Since the main interest of this chapter is differences in school behavior 
across population groups, we group schools into five groups—African, white, 
colored, Indian/Asian, and others (new schools)—in equation (2.2). I use 
race-group dummies to approximate differences in patterns where liquidity 
and subsidy constraints bind decisionmaking regarding the employment of 
educators. In this framework, we cannot distinguish whether the liquidity-
cum-resource constraint is binding or the target ratio is different across the 
groups. I exclude the latter case here. In the estimation, I also use magiste-
rial district dummies so that we capture variations across population groups 
within districts, in which schools and communities are more homogeneous 
than those in an entire province. By focusing on within-district cross-race 
differences, we can identify how differentially the liquidity constraint is 
binding the decision on adjusting the number of educators across popula-
tion groups. In the null hypothesis that the entire budget is pooled over all 
population groups, the liquidity (budget) constraint should bind equally for 
all the groups.
  The estimation of equation (2.2) requires additional consideration. It is 
possible for the past shock in the number of educators (εi1) to partly cause 
subsequent changes in the number of learners, E[ΔLi∈pεi1] ≠ 0. Suppose that a 
positive shock to the number of educators increases the incentives for poten-
tial learners to attend the school. This positive correlation leads to a negative 
bias in the OLS estimator in equation (2.2). In this sense, the endogenous
movement (decisionmaking) of learners influences the magnitude of the nega-
tive bias. Under this circumstance, it is likely that the true value of the 
slope is somewhere between a possibly upwardly biased estimate from the 
cross-sectional analysis in equation (2.1) and a possibly downwardly biased 
estimate from the panel analysis in equation (2.2).7
RACE, EQUITY, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS  23   
6 The approach we are taking looks similar to the one used in studies of liquidity constraint in 
firms’ investment behavior. However, in this method investment is regressed on changes in sales 
revenue that represent exogenous shocks. The null hypothesis is that changes in sales revenue 
have no effect on investment without liquidity constraint.
7 In Yamauchi (2005b) I used the instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity 
of changes in the number of learners. The first-stage estimation results are interesting since 
they show how the government can predict ex ante the number of future learners.Data Sources
SRN, with its main focus on the conditions of school facilities, was initially 
fielded in 1996. In that survey, trained fieldworkers attempted to visit all 
schools in the country and collected information from educators, mainly 
school principals. Although the survey’s coverage was found to be imperfect 
because some schools were not accessible during the survey preparation 
stage, this was the first systematic school census in the country. Schools were 
identified by school codes provided by provincial departments of education 
(EMIS codes) and by province codes, and also by latitude and longitude using 
a global positioning system.
  Four years later, the National Department of Education conducted the 
second round of the survey. This time, however, data were collected through 
questionnaires distributed to school principals. This means of data collection 
alerts us to possible errors in the recorded answers, especially those concern-
ing facility conditions: principals might want to attempt to get more funding 
by underreporting their school facilities, for example, building condition and 
the number of classrooms. To minimize this problem, the questionnaire was 
designed to elicit only changes from 1996 conditions, which were described 
on the distributed form.
  Yet even with potential measurement errors and bias in some questions, 
the 2000 survey accomplished almost-perfect coverage of schools in the coun-
try. In particular, fieldworkers visited those schools that were missed in SRN 
1996. Unlike SRN 1996, the 2000 version does not include technical colleges and 
special schools, but it completely covers all primary, secondary, and combined 
schools. (For detailed discussions of SRN 1996 and 2000, see EduAction 2001.) 
The data that I use here were provided by EduAction, Durban, and the National 
Department of Education, Pretoria. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics.
  For the purpose of constructing panel data, it is important to note that 
EMIS codes are also available in SRN 2000. However, some provincial depart-
ments of education changed their EMIS codes after 1996, and the details of 
the code changes are not transparent. Therefore I decided to include only 
provinces that used the same EMIS codes in 2000 as in 1996. As a result, Gau-
teng, Mpumalanga and Northern Cape are excluded from our sample for the 
analysis that follows.
  Another important feature of SRN 2000 for our purposes is that it asked 
about former departments that governed the schools under the apartheid 
regime. From this information, we can correctly identify the racial back-
ground of each school under the previous regime. The correspondence between 
former departments and population groups is as follows:
•   Whites—Department of Education and Culture: House of Assembly
•   Whites—Transvaal Education Department
24  CHAPTER 2•   Colored—Department of Education and Culture: House of Representatives
•   Indian/Asian—Department of Education and Culture: House of Delegates
•   African—Bophuthatswana Education Department
•   African—Ciskei Education Department
•   African—Department of Education and Training
•   African—Gazankulu Department of Education
•   African—KaNgwane Department of Education
•   African—KwaNdebele Department of Education
•   African—KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture
•   African—Lebowa Department of Education
•   African—QwaQwa Department of Education
•   African—Transkei Education Department 
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Table 2.2  Summary statistics
 Number  of    Standard
Variable observations  Mean  deviation  Minimum  Maximum
Public primary schools
  Learners 1996  6,214  400.0599  366.1124  3  5,292
  Educators 1996  6,234  11.62624  10.11832  1  68
  Learner-educator ratio 1996  6,168  34.02758  16.88301  1  536
  Learners 2000  9,170  305.1333  307.7398  1  3,711
  Educators 2000  9,422  9.066546  11.68714  1  805
  Learner-educator ratio 2000  9,170  31.55526  16.26099  0.0625  729
Public secondary schools
  Learners 1996  2,049  660.4461  399.2136  8  2,945
  Educators 1996  2,046  23.33382  14.78122  1  90
  Learner-educator ratio 1996  2,035  30.48634  12.53213  1  150
  Learners 2000  4,316  578.0461  350.3784  1  2,648
  Educators 2000  4,455  19.08485  11.46771  1  94
  Learner-educator ratio 2000  4,316  31.18687  10.08921  0.3333  179
Public primary schools
  Change in number of learners  5,366  –24.07697 161.6493  –3,986 2,692
  Change in number of educators  5,572  –0.6281407 4.100372  –49 104
Public secondary schools
  Change in number of learners  1,830  –21.81639 231.2277  –2,225 1,014
  Change in number of educators  1,913  –1.934135 7.070909  –46 67
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Notes:   Primary schools in 1996 include normal primary (grades 1–7), junior primary (grades 1–4), 
and senior primary schools (grades 5–8). Secondary schools in 1996 include normal secondary 
(grades 8–12), junior secondary (grades 8–10), and senior secondary schools (grades 10–12). 
Primary schools in 2000 refer to those with lowest grade 1 or higher and highest grade 7 
or lower. Secondary schools in 2000 refer to those with lowest grade 8 or higher and high-
est grade 12 or lower. Public schools in 1996 include state and state-aided schools. Sample 
excludes Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape provinces.•   African—Venda Education Department
•   All races—New schools established after 1994, New Education Department
  Under the post-apartheid regime, children of any racial origin can attend 
any school. In our analysis, those schools established after the end of apart-
heid are grouped as “new schools.” It should be emphasized here that, even 
though schools are sorted by former departments, the period covered by our 
analysis falls after apartheid. Therefore, all schools are theoretically race-
free in both 1996 and 2000. However, the reality of the racial composition 
of learners did not change substantially until 2000. The majority of formerly 
African schools are still in communities that are predominantly African, so 
the learners in those schools are still mostly African. Some formerly white 
schools now accept children from African families that have relatively high 
incomes and reside within commuting distance. Therefore—although my focus 
on population groups is approximate, as it does not reflect the exact racial 
composition of each school—I can capture the essence of social distance 
across racial groups in South Africa, where most schools and communities are 
still racially homogeneous even after apartheid.8
Empirical Findings
Three types of empirical analyses are conducted here. First, I statistically 
characterize the distributions of LERs in 1996 and 2000 in different popula-
tion groups. Cumulative distributions of LER are compared and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests are used for statistical comparisons of LER distributions of 
formerly African schools with other schools. Second, I depict the relationship 
between changes in educators and learners for each population group. Third, 
I conduct a panel analysis that differences out fixed effects to estimate the 
response of the number of learners to the number of educators.
Distribution Comparison
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show LER distributions in public primary and secondary 
schools for 1996 and 2000, respectively. Primary (grades 1–7), junior primary 
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8 However, the information on former departments is available only in SRN 2000, not in SRN 
1996. It is therefore necessary to merge SRNs 1996 and 2000 by EMIS and provincial codes in 
order to group schools covered in SRN 1996 by population group. As a result of this merging 
process, excluding Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape for the reason mentioned earlier, 
nearly 10 percent of primary and secondary schools in SRN 1996 do not match those in SRN 
2000. In the panel analysis of dynamic changes from 1996 to 2000 and in the cross-sectional 
analysis of differences across population groups in SRN 1996, I use only those schools that were 
correctly matched between SRN 1996 and SRN 2000.(grades 1–4), and senior primary (grades 5–7) are aggregated as primary schools, 
and secondary (grades 8–12), junior secondary (grades 8–10), and senior sec-
ondary (grade 11–12) are grouped as secondary schools. In these figures, distri-
butions are shown for schools for different former population groups—African 
(African), white, colored, Indian/Asian—and for new schools.
  For formerly African and new schools, LER distributions have long upper 
tails. For the sake of display, values of LER larger than 200 were omitted in 
these graphs, though there are substantial numbers of formerly African and 
new schools in this range. On the other hand, the distributions are shown to 
be concentrated within a range of relatively small values for formerly white, 
colored, and Indian/Asian schools. This basic characterization of differences 
in LER distributions across former population groups is valid for all types of 
schools—primary and secondary. The main findings on cross-group differences 
are quite similar in both primary and secondary schools.
  To statistically characterize differences in the LER distribution between 
formerly African schools and the other schools, I use Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests (Tables 2.3A and 2.3B). Table 2.3A shows two basic findings. First, in 
the country as a whole, the LER distributions of African primary and secondary 
schools are statistically different from those of white, colored, and Indian/
Asian schools in 1996 and 2000. In particular, the test statistics show that the 
distance between African and white has not narrowed from 1996 to 2000.
  Table 2.3B shows provincial-level results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests. At the provincial level I find that the results differ between provinces 
in 1996 and 2000. In 1996 the distance between African and white primary 
schools is found to be significant in many provinces, except Free State and 
North West, where the distances to colored, Indian/Asian, and other groups 
are also insignificant. In 2000, however, African and white primary schools 
are significantly different in all provinces. In this case, the difference remains 
quite robust between African and white in post-apartheid South Africa. Find-
ings for secondary schools are stronger than those for primary schools. In Free 
State and North West, where African and white are not different in primary 
schools, the distance is statistically significant in both 1996 and 2000.
  The findings clearly confirm our prior perception that formerly African 
schools, at both the primary and secondary levels, have not improved rela-
tive to formerly white schools, even under the post-apartheid government. 
This finding does not directly imply that African children in the country 
suffer more severely from low quality of education than white children. In 
post-apartheid South Africa, all schools must not discriminate among children 
based on their origins, and children of any racial origin are selectively admit-
ted. However, since most communities are still racially homogeneous, the 






























Figure 2.1A  Learner-educator ratio: Primary school, 1996
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Figure 2.1B  Learner-educator ratio: Primary school, 2000
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Figure 2.2A  Learner-educator ratio: Secondary school, 1996
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Figure 2.2B  Learner-educator ratio: Secondary school, 2000
Source:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (2000).32  CHAPTER 2
Table 2.3A  Tests on distribution comparison
Population group, year  White  Colored  Indian/Asian  New schools
Primary school
  1996  0.5019  0.4185  0.5156  0.1348
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.026)
  2000  0.3370  0.1279  0.1843  0.2208
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)
Secondary school
  1996  0.6729  0.6228  0.6677  0.2157
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
  2000  0.5202  0.2565  0.2710  0.1949
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Notes:   Numbers not in parentheses are D-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, and the 
numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Table 2.3B  Tests on distribution comparison by province
Province/population 
group, year  White  Colored  Indian/Asian  New schools
Eastern Cape
  Primary school
    1996  0.5074  0.5037  n.a.  0.3454
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.006)
    2000  0.2917  0.1971  0.6399  0.2583
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.235)  (0.000)
  Secondary school
    1996  0.6977  0.5803  0.7017  0.2643
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.598)  (0.035)
    2000  0.4953  0.2194  0.5442  0.1564
 (0.000)  (0.067)  (0.877)  (0.007)
Free State
  Primary school
    1996  0.2152  0.1152  0.4504  0.3495
 (0.152)  (0.516)  (0.154)  (0.024)
    2000  0.2140  0.1506  0.6553  0.4138
 (0.168)  (0.234)  (0.010)  (0.000)
  Secondary school
    1996  0.6217  0.7205  0.9379  0.2531
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.243)  (0.917)
    2000  0.5099  0.3220  0.9634  0.6391
 (0.000)  (0.055)  (0.216)  (0.000)
KwaZulu-Natal
  Primary school
    1996  0.5521  0.1284  0.6604  0.2115
 (0.001)  (0.331)  (0.000)  (0.549)
    2000  0.5798  0.0792  0.3036  0.2013
 (0.000)  (0.628)  (0.000)  (0.000)RACE, EQUITY, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS  33   
Table 2.3B  Continued
Province/population 
group, year  White  Colored  Indian/Asian  New schools
  Secondary school
    1996  0.7227  0.6012  0.6141  0.2212
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.873)
    2000  0.6592  0.2141  0.4566  0.2577
 (0.000)  (0.152)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Northern Province
  Primary school
    1996  0.7360  0.5039  0.9753  0.2545
 (0.000)  (0.148)  (0.201)  (0.010)
    2000  0.2988  0.3184  0.7742  0.4093
 (0.005)  (0.838)  (0.465)  (0.000)
  Secondary school
    1996  0.9194  n.a.  0.9964  0.2582
 (0.000)    (0.183)  (0.004)
    2000  0.4068  0.4549  n.a.  0.2743
 (0.014)  (0.662)    (0.000)
North West
  Primary school
    1996  0.5789  0.2244  0.3581  0.2008
 (0.032)  (0.587)  (0.218)  (0.382)
    2000  0.2152  0.3739  0.2901  0.2875
 (0.576)  (0.022)  (0.260)  (0.001)
  Secondary school
    1996  0.8347  0.5785  0.8760  0.3361
 (0.001)  (0.829)  (0.319)  (0.391)
    2000  0.5670  0.7050  0.4330  0.2160
 (0.000)  (0.154)  (0.729)  (0.493)
Western Cape
  Primary school
    1996  0.8714  0.7492  0.9302  0.5168
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.011)
    2000  0.7448  0.4732  0.7778  0.3333
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.030)
  Secondary school
    1996  0.9375  0.8548  0.9688  0.5417
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.253)
    2000  0.8141  0.3774  0.3182  0.1773
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.871)  (0.923)
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Notes:   Numbers not in parentheses are D-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, and the 
numbers in parentheses are p-values. n.a. means not available.former population group (per the 2000 SRN) still represents the majority of 
the racial group at the school level.
Learner-Educator Changes
To cope with variations in the slope parameter across population groups 
and regions, and possibly at various levels of learner changes, I sort them 
by population groups, to the extent that the sample size of each group can 
permit analysis. In preliminary analyses, I found that if I used primary and 
secondary schools separately, sample sizes for non-African schools at the 
provincial levels became too small.9
  Figure 2.3 depicts relationships between changes in primary-school edu-
cators and learners in 1996–2000 for all races and for different racial groups. 
The samples I use in this exercise are constructed as follows. Among schools 
that are successfully matched between SRN 1996 and 2000 by EMIS codes 
and province codes, I use only those classified by funding type as state or 
state-aided in 1996, those that show learner changes in the range of –1,000 
to 1,000, and those that show educator changes in the range of –100 to 100. 
I dropped observations with missing values for the total number of educators 
in 1996 or 2000. Primary schools include normal primary (grades 1–7), junior 
primary (grades 1–4), and senior primary (grades 5–7) in the 1996 survey. 
Similarly, secondary schools include secondary (grades 8–12), junior second-
ary (grades 8–10), and senior secondary (grades 11–12) in 1996. If schools 
changed the range of grades offered during the period, they experienced 
large increases or decreases in learners.
  In Figure 2.3 the relationship is close to linear but shows a slightly con-
vex shape. However, it is asymmetric between the point at which the num-
ber of learners increases and the point at which it decreases. The response 
of educators to increases in the number of learners is larger than that to 
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9 In nonparametric analysis of cross-provincial differences among African schools (Eastern Cape, 
Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Province (Limpopo), North West, and Western Cape), I used 
the same criteria used in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In all provinces, changes in educators responded 
to those in learners positively. Though we find some variations in the slope across provinces, the 
magnitude is very small among African schools. Strong nonlinearity cannot be detected in these 
figures. However, it seems that while some provinces, such as Eastern Cape, Northern Province, 
and North West, did not experience large changes in learners at the school level, other prov-
inces, such as Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, and Western Cape, have gone through large changes 
in number of learners.
  For African secondary schools by province, it is also found that changes in educators 
responded to those in learners positively in all provinces. However, except in KwaZulu-Natal, 
the variations in educator change seem to be larger in this case than those for primary schools. 
In this sense, the equity-improving interventions were larger in secondary schools, and thus 
worked to narrow the gaps across schools.Change in number of learners
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Figure 2.3A  Dynamic changes: Primary school
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Change in number of educators
Figure 2.3B  Dynamic changes: Primary school, African
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).22
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Change in number of learners
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Figure 2.3C  Dynamic changes: Primary school, white
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Figure 2.3D  Dynamic changes: Primary school, colored
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).18
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Figure 2.3E  Dynamic changes: Primary school, Indian/Asian




Change in number of learners
Change in number of educators
Figure 2.3F  Dynamic changes: Primary school, new schools
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).decreases in the number of learners. In Figure 2.3B, in African schools, 
we have the same observations. However, for white, colored, and Indian/
Asian schools, nonlinearity becomes very strong (Figures 2.3C, 2.3D, and 
2.3E). In white schools, while most observations show small changes in the 
number of learners, the overall shape is kinked with concavity (that is, 
there is slower adjustment when the number of learners increases). Among 
colored and Indian/Asian schools, however, the relationship is kinked and 
convex. Most observations in these groups also show small changes. In new 
schools that were established after 1994, the plot of results is nearly a 
straight line.
  Figure 2.4 depicts results for secondary schools. As in the case of primary 
schools, a nearly linear but slightly convex relationship is observed in all 
schools in the country (Figure 2.4A). The basic relationship holds among Afri-
can schools (Figure 2.4B). Figure 2.4C shows white schools: it looks strikingly 
similar to the case of primary schools. Though observations are less concen-
trated in showing small learner changes than those for primary schools, the
shape is kinked and concave. Strikingly, the number of educators does not respond 
significantly to large changes in the number of learners, but it does respond to 
small changes.
  One interesting observation from all these figures is that the cross-school 
variations in educator changes are quite large. The variations are large even 
with small changes in learners. One way to explain this finding is that govern-
ment interventions narrow the initially existing differences in LER, and that 
LER does not directly respond to changes in the number of learners. Alter-
natively, even without government intervention, schools might have made 
efforts to weaken their liquidity (budget) constraints in order to adjust the 
number of educators. In either case, we expect that larger 1996 LERs induce 
larger subsequent increases in the number of educators.
Estimation Results
In this section I show the results from the estimation that incorporates 
community-school level unobservable fixed components. To deal with the 
fixed effects, I difference out those between 1996 and 2000, using changes in 
the number of educators and learners. Even in this differenced form, district-
level dummies are included to control districtwise common changes in this 
period. Our focus in this exercise is on the differences across population 
groups in the response of the number of educators to changes in the num-
ber of learners. With district-level dummies, this procedure can essentially 
identify cross-group variations in the degree of educator adjustment within 
each district.
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Figure 2.4A  Dynamic changes: Secondary school
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Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Figure 2.4B  Dynamic changes: Secondary school, African20
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Figure 2.4C  Dynamic changes: Secondary school, white
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Figure 2.4D  Dynamic changes: Secondary school, colored
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).46
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Figure 2.4E  Dynamic changes: Secondary school, Indian/Asian
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Figure 2.4F  Dynamic changes: Secondary school, new schools
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).  This identification strategy calls for attention to the spatial residential 
pattern in South Africa, which is segregated by racial group. In the former 
homeland districts, for example, most of the communities are predominantly 
African, so that there exist few formerly white schools in such regions. This 
situation makes it difficult to identify gaps in school behavior between for-
merly African and white schools. However, provided that socioeconomic cir-
cumstances are diverse in different districts, it is more important to control 
the districtwise heterogeneity in terms of learners’ movement and school 
decisionmaking.
  We also need to consider a possible correlation between past shocks to 
educators and subsequent changes in learners over time. If such a correlation 
exists, the OLS estimates in the differenced forms will provide downwardly 
biased estimates of the slopes. In this section I not only difference out the 
fixed effects but also use instrumental variables available from the 1996 
data, so that consistent estimates of the slopes are obtained. The details 
of this process were discussed in the “Framework” section. The results are 
summarized in Tables 2.4A and 2.4B, respectively, for primary and secondary 
schools. I also decompose the educators into two categories: subsidized and 
nonsubsidized.
  Column 1 in Table 2.4A shows the response of the number of all educators to 
changes in the number of learners. First, the number of educators responds 
positively to an increase in the number of learners. Second, in this basic 
specification, differences from African schools are all significant. The number 
of educators increases more in white, colored, Indian/Asian, and new schools 
than in African schools, as the number of learners increases. Third, the inter-
action of learner changes with the indicator of an increase in learners shows 
some asymmetry in the educators’ adjustment.
  In column 2, where I use only subsidized educators, the basic findings that 
I obtained for all educators hold. Column 3 shows the case of nonsubsidized 
educators. Contrary to the previous cases, the number of nonsubsidized edu-
cators increases more significantly when the number of learners increases than 
when it decreases.
  Table 2.4B displays the estimation results for secondary schools. The 
results are very different from those for primary schools. The benchmark 
response of African school educators is significant in all three cases. First, 
except for white schools, there are no significant differences in educator 
adjustment behavior from African schools. Second, and very interestingly, 
the response of the white school educators to changes in the number of 
learners is smaller than in the benchmark African school case. Adding the two 
estimates gives nearly zero response in white schools. This large difference 
from the primary school case suggests that at the secondary level the number 
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Table 2.4A  Dynamic response: Public primary schools
 All  educators  Subsidized  Nonsubsidized
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)
Change in number of learners  0.0068  0.0065  0.0003
 (3.13)  (3.14)  (1.04)
  × White  0.0107  0.0044  0.0063
 (2.89)  (1.05)  (3.41)
  × Colored  0.0018  0.0018  –0.00007
 (0.61)  (0.69)  (0.13)
  × Indian/Asian  0.0094  0.0079  0.0015
 (4.75)  (4.26)  (2.04)
  × New schools  0.0167  0.0159  0.0008
 (1.72)  (1.62)  (0.57)
  × Indicator: increase  0.0122  0.0120  0.0003
 (3.96)  (3.90)  (0.54)
Number of observations  4,663  4,663  4,663
R2 0.3823  0.4028  0.1666
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Notes:   The dependent variable is change in number of educators. The numbers in parentheses 
are absolute t-values. All specifications include race and district dummies. Robust stan-
dard errors are used with district-level clusters.
Table 2.4B  Dynamic response: Public secondary schools
 All  educators  Subsidized  Nonsubsidized
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)
Change in number of learners  0.0087  0.0081  0.0005
 (4.60)  (4.35)  (1.53)
  × White  –0.0069  –0.0087 0.0018
 (2.51)  (2.98)  (1.71)
  × Colored  0.0133  0.0126  0.0007
 (3.23)  (2.83)  (0.84)
  × Indian/Asian  0.0112  0.0096  0.0017
 (1.25)  (1.06)  (1.67)
  × New schools  0.0023  0.0015  0.0008
 (0.99)  (0.63)  (1.14)
  × Indicator: increase  0.0080  0.0079  0.00005
 (2.36)  (2.26)  (0.06)
Number of observations  1,646  1,646  1,646
R2 0.5209  0.5300  0.3658
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (1996, 2000).
Notes:   The dependent variable is change in number of educators. The numbers in parentheses 
are absolute t-values. All specifications include race and district dummies. Robust standard 
errors are used with district-level clusters.of educators has already been close to the optimal level among white schools, 
so that even in response to relatively small changes in the number of learn-
ers, schools do not adjust the number of educators significantly. Third, col-
ored schools show stronger responses than African schools. There seem to be 
larger behavioral variations across different population groups in secondary 
schools than in primary schools. Fourth, except for the case of nonsubsidized 
educators, changes in the number of educators are larger when the number 
of learners increases than when it decreases.
Summary
The empirical results show that opportunities for education in public schools 
are still unequal between African and white children in South Africa, even 
after the end of apartheid. The LERs in public primary and secondary schools 
differ statistically between African and white groups. During the period 1996–
2000, overall differences in the distribution of LERs have not changed, and 
in some cases the gaps have been even reinforced for secondary schools. The 
resulting inequality in opportunities for education could lead to persistent 
inequality in labor markets and earning opportunities since the quantity and 
quality of education crucially determine labor market outcomes.
  The dynamics of school education also demonstrate strong inequity 
between population groups. The number of educators responds to changes in 
the number of learners in all population groups at the primary school level. 
However, the adjustment in the number of educators is significantly larger 
for formerly white, colored, Indian/Asian, and new schools than African 
schools. On the other hand, at the secondary school level, the results do not 
display significant apartheid-type inequity. In the case of white schools, the 
number of educators does not respond to changes in the number of learners, 
probably because these schools have retained their initial superiority.
  One possible reason why LERs have not converged even after the abolition 
of apartheid is that school fees charged at formerly white schools increased 
to prevent the entry of African children (Selod and Zenou 2003) (though 
the empirical analyses in this chapter do not address this proposition). This 
screening mechanism could partially explain changes in the number of learn-
ers and why LERs did not converge rapidly. It is also very difficult to obtain 
data on racial composition in each school.
  Our empirical results call for stronger policy support for African primary 
schools and schoolchildren, which can contribute to the human-capital-based 
reduction of the poverty and inequality that have resulted from apartheid in 
South Africa.
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School Quality, Clustering, and Government Subsidy
G
eography becomes critical when access to opportunities is distributed 
unevenly over space. For example, when good schools are concen-
trated in urban areas, one must live in these areas to have good 
educational opportunities and therefore good job prospects. In South Africa, 
which experienced nearly more than 40 years of apartheid, different popu-
lation groups were segregated in separate residential areas with unequal 
access to education.1 As a result, location was a critical factor. This chapter 
examines how spatial factors, highly correlated with historical factors, are 
determining school quality in post-apartheid South Africa.
  Two factors are relevant to the way in which school quality is deter-
mined. First, the legacy of apartheid imposes historical constraints on the 
spatial distribution of income and population groups. Good schools are 
located in selected areas. This has maintained interracial diversity in access 
to good education, as well as racial and socioeconomic homogeneity within 
neighborhoods.2
  Second, even if the mobility of populations was unrestricted after the 
abolition of apartheid, household-level financial constraints coupled with 
the imperfect credit market often prevent the poor from moving into those 
well-off areas that offer better educational opportunities. Thus the opportu-
nity for better education is geographically correlated with land prices.3 Even 
though African children can commute to formerly white schools, in so doing 
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This chapter is reproduced in part from an article in the journal Economics of Education Review 
(Yamauchi 2010).
1 For accounts of the general situation in South African education, see Kriege et al. (1994); 
Crouch (1996); Bot, Wilson, and Dove (2000); Shindler and Fleisch (2007); van der Berg (2007); 
Bloch et al. (2008); and Fleisch (2008). As van der Berg (2007) argues, race still remains a major 
factor in explaining school performance.
2 Yamauchi (2007a) discussed the importance of observed neighborhood heterogeneity for 
agents’ learning about returns to schooling and deciding on schooling investment. Whether a 
society is heterogeneous or homogeneous has dynamic implications.
3 This point has not yet been seriously examined, though casual observations support this 
proposition.they incur additional transportation and time costs. Accordingly I explore the 
impact of apartheid on the spatial distribution of quality education under the 
post-apartheid regime, in which spatial mobility is legally unrestricted.4
  This chapter asks how historical and location factors affect access to qual-
ity education in post-apartheid South Africa through the use of a unique data-
base combining the 2002 school census and the Community Profile Database 
from the 2001 South African census. With the addition of GIS information, 
these data enable us to identify the location of a given school and to corre-
late that with local socioeconomic characteristics.
  Given the abovementioned spatial dependence, the role of government 
subsidy is expected to be significant in creating equitable and equal access
to education. I assess to what extent government subsidy disconnects the 
linkage between local resources and school quality, given that school fee 
determines school quality. For this purpose, I use school finance data from 
the province of KwaZulu-Natal to analyze the dependence of school quality, 
measured by the LER, on school fee and government subsidy.
  Selod and Zenou (2003) examined the role of school fees in screening 
children from different backgrounds in a spatial model, showing that whites 
tend to overprice education in order to limit the numbers of African learners. 
It is likely that a high school fee supports high school quality even in South 
African public schools, as well as keeping the community and schools racially 
homogeneous. This chapter also provides some insight into this question.
  The chapter is organized as follows. The section “Dependence of School 
Quality on Local Resources” discusses how school quality (inputs) can depend 
on local resources in South Africa. The following section describes the empiri-
cal framework and data used in the analysis.
  Empirical results are summarized in the next section. First, some key 
spatial features of school fee distributions and population group compositions 
in South Africa are demonstrated and linked with the history of apartheid. 
School fees are significantly higher among formerly non-African schools and 
in predominantly white areas.
  Second, while local population-group composition and former apartheid 
departments of education still influence the way in which school fees (and 
thus school quality) are determined for local public schools, the role of 
local income opportunity is also significant, especially in large cities. Third, 
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4 Chapter 2 examined how LERs changed between 1996 and 2000, splitting the sample into for-
merly African, white, colored, and Indian/Asian schools. I showed that the change in the num-
ber of educators in response to a change in the number of learners is smaller in formerly African 
schools than in formerly white schools. This finding implies that the former group has been more 
likely to face financial constraints.evidence from KwaZulu-Natal shows that school fees and per-learner govern-
ment subsidies improve school quality, decreasing the LER and implying that 
more progressive allocation of subsidies can improve the quality of schools 
located in under-resourced communities. Policy implications are discussed in 
the final section.
Dependence of School Quality on Local Resources
School quality is a function of school inputs, which in the context of South 
Africa are determined by local resource availability (through school fees) and 
government subsidy. Here “school quality” does not mean learning achieve-
ments or educational outcomes. We assume that a given outcome is a func-
tion of not only school quality (inputs)—including the availability of qualified 
teaching staff—but also of learners’ family backgrounds and their own efforts 
and ability. This chapter focuses on the resources available to schools.
  Distinguishing between school inputs and educational outcomes is impor-
tant. To analyze the determinants of educational outcomes, it is necessary 
to use some outcome measures such as test scores at the individual level or 
school averages. Qualified empirical analyses prove significant causal effects 
of school inputs on achievement (for example, Card and Krueger 1996; Angrist 
and Lavy 1999; Case and Deaton 1999; Krueger 1999; Hoxby 2000; Dustman, 
Rajah, and Soest 2003), though the literature has in general drawn mixed con-
clusions (Hanushek 1998), and causality seems to depend on subjects (Steele, 
Vignoles, and Jenkins 2007).
  In the context of South Africa, Case and Deaton (1999) show that school 
resources, measured by LER, can explain test scores using variations in the 
ratio from that under apartheid.
  More directly van der Berg (2007) used matriculation test pass rates to ana-
lyze the effects of school resources and socioeconomic factors on learners’ 
learning performance. School fees, LER, and average teacher salary signifi-
cantly influence the matriculation pass rate. Interestingly, former depart-
ments also have a significant effect on the rate. However, if the sample is 
restricted to formerly African schools, LER loses its statistical significance, 
implying that resource variations within this group are not relatively large. 
The level of school fees, correlated with local socioeconomic factors (as dis-
cussed later), significantly explains the matriculation pass rate even within 
formerly African schools.5
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5 In his paper, van der Berg (2007) argues that historical factors, such as former departments, 
teacher quality, and school management, are more important than school resources in deter-
mining school performance. Former departments are clearly correlated with matriculation pass 
rates. This tendency did not change even with progressive changes in school resource allocation   The mobility of learners and the dynamic nature of human capital forma-
tion raise other concerns. Since learners, especially at the secondary level 
under the post-apartheid regime, can potentially choose their schools more 
freely, endogenous school choice (mobility across communities) can be an 
important factor in determining educational outcomes at the school level.6 
Similarly, since prior investments in human capital affect educational out-
comes at later stages, schooling inputs and outcomes at the primary school 
level are expected to influence those at the secondary level.7 While mobil-
ity of learners can potentially weaken the spatial correlation between local 
factors and school outcomes, the dynamic production of human capital can 
strengthen the correlation.
  To understand the linkage between school quality and local resources, 
we need to know the roles of school governing bodies (SGBs). It is the SGB—a 
group consisting of the principal, teachers, community leaders, parents, 
and in some secondary schools, learners themselves—that sets school fees. 
Accordingly, the school fees charged represent the community’s ability to pay 
for education.8 SGBs are playing an even greater role now; under recently 
implemented funding reforms, provincial governments allocate school subsi-
dies according to local poverty measures. To assess the quality of education, 
information on school fees charged by local public schools is used. In South 
Africa, school fees determine not only school quality but also the likelihood 
that residents will be able to afford investments in schooling.
  Until recently, government educational subsidies in South Africa have 
been limited, so financing of schools relies heavily on the collection of school 
fees—in effect a user charge—from parents. As mentioned in paragraph 46 of 
the 1998 Norms and Standards for School Funding,
Ironically, given the emphasis on redress and equity, the funding pro-
visions of the Act appear to have worked thus far to the advantage of 
public schools patronized by middle-class and wealthy parents. The 
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under the post-apartheid regime. We argue that the ability to hire more qualified teachers 
depends on the community’s income level (school fees), which is spatially clustered in today’s 
South Africa.
6 Van der Berg (2007) reports that learners do not systematically move to better-quality schools 
probably because of lack of information on school performance, and that the amount of move-
ment to private schools is minor. However, this observation was based on Western Cape prov-
ince, so it is difficult to generalize.
7 In a slightly different context, but one highly relevant to this issue, Yamauchi (2008) showed 
significant effects of preschool nutrition intake (forming early-childhood human capital) on 
schooling outcomes.
8 See the 1998 Norms and Standards for School Funding (Republic of South Africa 1998), which 
was announced in response to the South African School Act (Republic of South Africa 1996b).apartheid regime favored such communities with high-quality facili-
ties, equipment and resources. Vigorous fund-raising by parent bod-
ies, including commercial sponsorships and fee income, have enabled 
many such schools to add to their facilities, equipment and learning 
resources, and expand their range of cultural and sporting activities. 
Since 1995, when such schools have been required to down-size their 
staff establishments, many have been able to recruit additional staff 
on governing body contracts, paid from the school fund.
  As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, local resource availabil-
ity is determined by historical and spatial factors, which are correlated in 
the current empirical context, given limited government subsidy. Choice of 
residential area is limited even now, so schools that are locally available to 
African children are largely formerly African institutions, many of which were 
historically disadvantaged and remain so. Schools in well-off areas can charge 
higher school fees, which not only finance school inputs but also allow them 
to avoid the enrollment of children from low-income families.
  A school fee represents the community’s capability to finance local pub-
lic education. Yamauchi and Nishiyama (2005) analyzed the effect of local 
income distribution on the determination of school fees, showing that inequal-
ity decreases the level of school fee. Thus low-income groups in a community 
pull down school fees, an outcome that decreases school quality for all chil-
dren in the community.9
  If school inputs depend on local resources, to what extent does govern-
ment subsidy disconnect the linkage between local resources and school 
quality? How effectively can progressive subsidy change the linkage between 
school quality and historically constrained local resource availability? In this 
analysis, I use LER as a measure of school quality (resource) to explore how 
local resources, approximated by school fees, and government subsidy can 
jointly determine school quality.
  There is a potential substitution (trade-off) between local and government 
resources, both of which determine school inputs. If government subsidy com-
pletely equalizes unequal local endowments, school quality no longer depends 
on local resources. From a policy perspective, we are interested in knowing 
how differentially elastically our measure of school quality (LER) can change in 
response to changes in school fees versus government subsidy. In the following 
sections, we discuss the empirical framework, data, and results.
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9 In different contexts, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show 
the importance of local governance in public investment decisionmaking.Empirical Framework and Data
School Fees
To assess the effects of historical and spatial factors on school quality, we 
estimate the following equation in which the log of school fee represents 
school quality:
 ln  pjkt = α + x′ kt–sβ1 + z′ jkβ2 + εjkt, (3.1)
where ln pjkt is the log of the school fee at school j in location (subplace) k at 
year t; xkt–s is location factors such as local population composition and eco-
nomic conditions at s years prior to t; zjk is historical factors at school j, such 
as the former department; and εjkt is an error term. Officially, a subplace is 
defined as the smallest geographic unit available from the census, by which 
we can identify the location as well as its characteristics. The novel feature
of this approach is that location factors are discovered from merging school 
data and geographic database by GIS.10
  The data come from two different sources. Local characteristics are 
taken from the Census 2001 Community Profile Database (Statistics South 
Africa). This database provides distributions of socioeconomic characteristics 
in the 2001 census at the subplace level for the whole country. It covers, for 
example, education, labor force, migration, settlement types, and popula-
tion group compositions.
  GIS data available in school censuses can help identify in which subplace a 
school is located.11 The school identification codes, EMIS, enable us to merge 
the Census 2001 subplace data and school censuses. School fees in 2001 are 
captured in the Annual School Survey 2002 (National Department of Educa-
tion). The information on former education departments is available in the 
SRN 2000 (National Department of Education).
School Quality
To answer the question of how the government can improve school quality 
and support the poor with spatially targeted interventions, we estimate the 
following school production functions:
  Δyjk = γ0 + γ1 ln pjkt + γ2 ln gjkt + z′ jkζ + Δξj (3.2)
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10 In the estimation, spatial dependence is not explicitly identified in the error term, beyond 
allowing clustered correlations within each subplace (robust standard errors).
11 Using the same datasets, Yamauchi and Nishiyama (2005) analyze the effect of local income 
distribution within a subplace on the determination of school fees in public schools therein.and
  ΔYjk = γ0 + γ1 ln pjkt + γ2 ln gjkt + γ3ΔLjk
 +  γ4 ln pjktΔLjk + γ5 ln gjktΔLjk + z′ jkζ + Δξj, (3.3)
where Δ is the difference operator, Y jk is the number of educators, Ljk is the 
number of learners, yjk is the LER, and gjkt is the per-learner subsidy from 
the government. Here zjk includes indicators of former departments. In both 
specifications, we take the first difference between two periods to eliminate 
school- and location-specific unobserved fixed effects.
  The LER is used as a measure of school quality. However, we also admit 
that this measure can only partially capture overall school quality, which is 
determined by such other measures as teaching facilities (classroom condi-
tions) and quality of school administration. I constructed the LER from two 
school censuses in 1996 and 2000, which focus on school facilities.12 Since the 
government subsidy allocation had in principle not changed before 2000, we 
assume that the subsidy reported for 2000 was basically applied to the period 
before 2000.
  To supplement the limited number of subsidized educators, community 
members can collect school fees and employ educators privately. I therefore 
also test whether a change in the number of learners induces a change in the 
number of educators who are privately employed in the community.
  If the government allocates subsidy more to disadvantaged schools (that 
is, a smaller number of educators relative to the number of learners), poten-
tial bias in γ2 would be upward since differenced ξjt are positively correlated 
with per-learner subsidy gjkt. On the other hand, if government subsidy allo-
cation increases inequality in the number of educators, we expect a down-
ward bias in the estimate. However, since fixed unobservables are already 
differenced out, the systematic component of endogenous subsidy allocation 
has no impact on our estimates.
  Finally, the determination of per-learner subsidy is also of interest in the 
empirical analysis. Though one possible way to eliminate the bias mentioned 
earlier is to use instruments for gjkt, we lack identifying instruments in the 
available data. Therefore I simply examine the effects of school fees, the 
initial LER, former departments, and school type and location fixed effects.
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12 Since measurement errors are reported on number of learners in the Annual School Surveys, 
we decided to use the 1996 and 2000 SRNs. These have a simplified questionnaire structure 
focusing on school facility information. Therefore, they are likely to have smaller measurement 
errors.  For this analysis, I use school and community information from the province 
of KwaZulu-Natal. School information comes from the Annual School Survey 
1999 (Department of Education) and the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Educa-
tion’s Norms and Standards database. The information on school fees in 1999 and 
2000 is also from the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education. In the province 
of KwaZulu-Natal, therefore, we can track dynamic changes in school fees to 
check the robustness of the principal findings.
  To assess school quality, I use SRN 1996 and 2000 (National Department of 
Education), which focus on school facility information, making them suitable 
for computing changes in LERs and number of educators from 1996 to 2000.13
  Data on government subsidy are from the KwaZulu-Natal Department of 
Education (Norms and Standards database). Current funding reforms in the 
South African public education system attempt to allocate more funding to 
poor schools and communities on the basis of a poverty ranking of schools and 
areas within each province. I use the information on actual funding during 
the period January–March 2000, before the implementation of the funding 
reforms, so that we can assume that it represents the status quo in the period 
prior to 2000.
Empirical Results
School Fees, Apartheid Education Departments, 
and School Neighborhoods
This section clarifies some features of the public education system in South 
Africa, using school fees as a proxy for school quality. We need to be aware 
of the history of modern South Africa, and of two factors in particular. The 
first is the segregation policy adopted in education under apartheid, by which 
population groups were separated from each other in various dimensions. In 
public education, different departments were responsible for different popu-
lation groups, and children from different population groups were segregated 
in separate schools. The second factor is the spatial distribution of residential 
areas and school locations. Because of the segregation policy under apart-
heid, different population groups were not allowed to live in the same area. 
Thus formerly white schools are located in formerly white areas.
  Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of annual school fees charged for 
public schools in 2001 (the weight being number of learners). The mean 
school fee is 431.72 rand, while the median is 50 rand, which implies that 
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13 In this analysis, we need information on school fees and government funding as key explana-
tory factors. Since the latter information is available only in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, we 
restrict our analysis to that province.the distribution is highly skewed. Interestingly the graph exhibits a clear 
bimodal distribution, showing that a group of public schools charges higher 
fees than the majority. It is also possible that their locations have certain 
characteristics in common.
  Figure 3.2 depicts school fee distributions for population groups defined 
by the former education departments, to illustrate the impact of apartheid 
on school fee distribution. In South Africa before 1994, the Department of 
Education and Culture’s House of Assembly (HOA), House of Representatives 
(HOR), and House of Delegates (HOD) governed white, colored, and Indian/
Asian schools, respectively. The Transvaal Education Department (TED) rep-
resented white schools in Gauteng province. Schools established after 1994 
are categorized as a new group. These figures clearly show the importance 
of the historical influence of the former regime. Schools formerly under the 
control of HOA, HOR, HOD, and TED charged higher school fees than schools 
for other groups. The finding suggests that, given that school fees are posi-
tively correlated with school quality, formerly white, colored, and Indian/
Asian schools provide higher-quality education than the majority of formerly 
African schools.







Figure 3.1  Distribution of log annual school fee
























Figure 3.2  Former department groups and log annual school fee
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (2000, 2002).
  Next, the relationship between former departments and population group 
composition in school neighborhoods is demonstrated. Table 3.1 shows the pro-
portions of African, white, colored, and Indian/Asian populations in the census 
subplace of school location. Note that the population group compositions are 
computed from the Census 2001 Community Profile Database, whereas former 
departments are those under the pre-1994 apartheid regime.
  It is interesting to confirm that formerly white schools are located in 
subplaces where the white population is still the majority. Similarly, for-
merly Indian/Asian schools are in subplaces where the majority population is 
Indian/Asian. Formerly colored schools are in colored and white-dominated SCHOOL QUALITY, CLUSTERING, AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY  55   
Table 3.1  Population group compositions in school neighborhoods
Local population group  Number of    Standard
composition observations  Mean  deviation  Minimum  Maximum
Primary schools
  African
    Proportion African  13,359  0.9442374  0.1376764  0  1
    Proportion white  13,359  0.0386878  0.1017163  0  1
    Proportion colored  13,359  0.0144011  0.0679492  0  0.9874739
    Proportion Indian/Asian  13,359  0.0026737  0.0303421  0  0.9637306
  White
    Proportion African  983  0.3257602  0.3057272  0  1
    Proportion white  983  0.5418614  0.3102345  0  0.9710921
    Proportion colored  983  0.1059982  0.2009087  0  0.9740787
    Proportion Indian/Asian  983  0.0263803  0.0571967  0  0.6671807
  Colored
    Proportion African  1,378  0.2563067  0.3321149  0  1
    Proportion white  1,378  0.1023137  0.1501915  0  1
    Proportion colored  1,378  0.6316433  0.3432725  0  1
    Proportion India/Asian  1,378  0.0097363  0.0498904  0  0.8288214
  Indian/Asian
    Proportion African  331  0.3177387  0.3230634  0.0034247  1
    Proportion white  331  0.0607398  0.1713729  0  0.8977141
    Proportion colored  331  0.0482009  0.1383091  0  0.9862803
    Proportion Indian/Asian  331  0.5733206  0.3796239  0  0.9885057
Secondary schools
  African
    Proportion African  4,475  0.9604805  0.1489296  0  1
    Proportion white  4,475  0.0249173  0.1126637  0  1
    Proportion colored  4,475  0.0100202  0.0649181  0  0.9798253
    Proportion Indian/Asian  4,475  0.004582  0.0447487  0  0.9756098
  White
    Proportion African  439  0.281697  0.2692092  0  1
    Proportion white  439  0.5917889  0.2862688  0  1
    Proportion colored  439  0.0990783  0.1792077  0  0.9653361
    Proportion Indian/Asian  439  0.0274358  0.0466701  0  0.3062209
  Colored
    Proportion African  270  0.1625991  0.2753492  0  1
    Proportion white  270  0.1162389  0.2441152  0  0.9690049
    Proportion colored  270  0.7080628  0.3575151  0  0.9976985
    Proportion Indian/Asian  270  0.0130991  0.0312058  0  0.3442088
  Indian/Asian
    Proportion African  102  0.1836393  0.2368411  0.0057471  1
    Proportion white  102  0.036181  0.1496807  0  0.9404537
    Proportion colored  102  0.0538794  0.1605563  0  0.9826432
    Proportion Indian/Asian  102  0.7263002  0.3122672  0  0.9885057
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (2000); Republic of South Africa, Statistics 
South Africa (2001).
Note:   The proportion of each population group is used in the census subplace where a school is 
located.areas, respectively. Schools under the other former departments for the Afri-
can population are located in predominantly African residential areas.
  To disentangle the spatial relationship between school fees and popula-
tion composition, Figure 3.3A shows kernel regression line linking school fees 
to the proportion of whites in a given subplace. Given that the movement 
of the African population to formerly white residential areas was prohibited 
under the apartheid regime and is still limited today for financial reasons, the 
proportion of whites in the population tells us whether a particular school is 
located in a formerly white area.
  Interestingly, in Figure 3.3B the distribution falls into two groups (concen-
trations). Higher school fees are likely to be charged in the areas where the 
majority population is white.14 Figure 3.3 (together with Figure 3.2 and Table 
3.1) demonstrates not only the systematic segregation policy in the education 
system under the apartheid regime, but also that location factors and spatial 
segregation of different socioeconomic groups (correlated with population 
groups) are important in determining opportunities for quality education in 
the next generation.
The Effects of Local Characteristics on School Fees
Table 3.2 shows two sets of results, for South Africa as a whole and for its 
metropolitan areas (Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban) where popula-
tion inflow has been significant since 1994. Each specification includes dis-
trict fixed effects.
  The points observed in the previous section are confirmed, namely that for-
mer education departments and the proportion of whites in the population in 
a given subplace influence the ability to pay for education quality. In addition, 
the implications listed in “Empirical Framework and Data” are tested here. 
Income opportunities are measured by average household income, the average 
years of schooling in the population aged 20–64, and the unemployment rate. 
To characterize the economic values of residential areas, the distribution of 
settlement types and population density from the 2001 census are used.
  Column 1 lists factors that represent apartheid regime and type of resi-
dential area. First, the proportion of Africans and whites in the population 
has significant negative and positive effects on school fees, respectively. 
Colored and Indian/Asian cases have been omitted. It is clear that the spatial 
segregation of population groups significantly affects school fees.
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14 In general Africans move into formerly white residential areas, while whites do not move into 
predominantly African residential areas. There are some exceptions, such as downtown Johan-
nesburg, where the inflow of Africans adversely affected white businesses, causing whites to 





Figure 3.3A  School fee and proportion of white population: Kernel
Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (2000, 2002); Republic of South 
Africa, Statistics South Africa (2001).






Sources:   Republic of South Africa, Department of Education (2000, 2002); Republic of South 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  Second, schools formerly under HOA, HOD, and TED charge significantly 
higher school fees. The omitted case here is schools established after 1994 
under the New Education Department. Combined with previous segregation 
in residential locations, apartheid still influences school quality.
  Third, the distribution of residents among urban, informal, industrial, 
institutional, or hostel significantly affects school fees. Omitted cases include 
sparse, tribal, farm, or smallholding settlements. Therefore, schools in urban 
areas are likely to charge higher school fees, leading to higher education 
quality. The effect of population density is, however, insignificant.
  Column 2 considers metropolitan areas. Although qualitatively similar 
results were obtained, the magnitude of the parameter estimates for the pro-
portions of Africans and whites in the population is greater than that for the 
results in column 1. In this sense, population group compositions at the sub-
place level seem to be more influential in the large cities. Similarly, the effects 
of HOA, HOD, and TED are larger than in column 1. Hence, it appears that in 
general the former apartheid regime affects school fees more significantly in 
these metropolitan areas than in the rest of the country. Population composi-
tion, however, is highly correlated with income and level of education.
  Columns 3 and 4 focus on factors that represent income opportunities. 
These variables are expected to be significant if the credit market is imper-
fect. In the country as a whole, mean household income and average years of 
schooling (ages 20–64) significantly increase school fees, while the unemploy-
ment rate significantly decreases school fees. These results are consistent 
with the predictions of the simple model described in the section “Depen-
dence of School Quality on Local Resources.”
  In column 4 the sample is restricted to Johannesburg, Cape Town, and
Durban. Mean household income, average years of schooling, and the un-
employment rate significantly affect school fees. The income effect is greater 
here than that in the country as a whole. Consistent with the previous find-
ings on population composition in metropolitan areas, the income gap cor-
related with population composition matters more in metropolitan areas 
than nationally. In contrast, the effects of settlement type become weaker 
in metropolitan areas.
  Finally, columns 5 and 6 include apartheid-regime and income opportunity 
factors. Column 5 shows that both factors matter significantly. The magni-
tude of the impact, however, differs between the two. While population 
group composition remains as influential as in columns 1 and 2, the effects 
of mean household income, average years of schooling, and the unemploy-
ment rate become much smaller than in column 3. That is, even though 
financial and labor-market constraints under the current regime seem to be 
significant, historical factors originating under the apartheid system (partly 
60  CHAPTER 3correlated with income opportunities) are more significant in the way they 
constrain the ability to pay for school quality and the quality of schooling 
investments in the next generation.
  In metropolitan areas (column 6), however, the effect of the proportion 
of Africans in the population decreases by nearly half (from 0.412 to 0.205) 
and becomes insignificant, while the effect of average income increases from 
0.031 to 0.213 and is thus significant. Socioeconomic factors matter more in 
these large cities than in the country as a whole.
School Quality, Local Resources, and Government Subsidy
This section summarizes estimation results on school quality determination. 
School quality is measured by LER and the sensitivity of the number of educa-
tors to changes in the number of learners, which I construct from SRN 1996 
and 2000. An increase in LER implies a decrease in school quality.15
  In the education function that I estimate, inputs are (log transformed) 
school fee and per-learner funding from the government. As discussed in 
previous sections, the school fee for 1998 is taken from the Annual School 
Survey for 1999. School funding information comes from the KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of Education.
  Table 3.3 shows our empirical results. Columns 1–3 use school fees in dif-
ferent years. The dependent variables are changes in LER from 1996 to 2000. 
Former population group, school type, and circuit indicators are controlled. 
Parameters of interest are school fee and per-learner funding. In those col-
umns, the effects of these revenue conditions are significant and negative. 
Thus a better school financial situation improves school quality. In a prelimi-
nary analysis, the log of the 2000 school fee was included, but its effect on 
dynamic change in the LER from 1996 to 2000 was insignificant. Column 3 uses 
per-learner total revenue (excluding government funding), which also has a 
significant and negative effect on LER.
  In columns 4 and 5, I test how school financing can change the number of 
privately employed educators (nonsubsidized educators), controlling changes 
in the number of learners. First, an increase in the number of learners 
increases the number of those educators. Second, the log of the 1998 school 
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15 The difficulty in identifying the causality arises from potential endogeneity in the number of 
learners and unobserved fixed components specific to school and community, which are likely 
to be correlated with school inputs. For example, Lazear (2001) argues that the effect of LER 
on learner achievement could be empirically ambiguous because of (often unobserved) hetero-
geneity in learners’ quality, that is, discipline. In his model, the optimal size of a class (that is, 
LER) increases if learners’ discipline improves, since the probability of disruption in a classroom 
decreases. To avoid such a correlation between LER and unobservables, recent studies use exog-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.fee increases the number of nonsubsidized educators, while government 
funding decreases the number. Third, and most interestingly, the interaction 
term of log school fee and change in the number of learners shows a signifi-
cant positive effect, which implies that with a higher school fee (that is, a 
greater ability to pay for schooling in the community), an increase in the 
number of learners can be accommodated by an increase in privately paid 
educators. These results are consistent with the prediction that communities 
that are capable of paying for schooling investments will increase the quality 
of education for the next generation with their own resources.
  In the last column, per-learner funding is regressed on the 1998 school 
fee and 1996 LER with fixed effects of former population group, school type, 
and circuit. The estimate shows that in 2000 those schools (and areas) that 
were initially less well endowed were likely to receive more funding from 
the government.
Conclusions
Neighborhood factors matter, as agents with similar socioeconomic back-
grounds are likely to be clustered in the same space. This happens partly 
because apartheid created inequality in income opportunities (correlated 
with population groups) and introduced spatial segregation by population 
group, and partly because even after the abolition of apartheid, financial 
constraints remained important in choice of residential location, which in 
turn determines access to income and educational opportunities.
  This chapter examined historical and spatial factors that determine 
education quality and a community’s capacity to finance education in post-
apartheid South Africa. Our findings show that both historical and financial 
constraints matter in terms of access to quality education. First, population 
group compositions created by apartheid (especially proportions of Africans 
and whites) at the subplace level and by the former departments of edu-
cation significantly affect school fees and therefore quality of education. 
Higher school fees are charged in residential areas with a large proportion of 
whites in the population. Second, average income, schooling, and unemploy-
ment rate at the subplace level also influence the determination of school 
fees, a finding that implies the existence of an imperfect credit market.
  Migration to cities became unrestricted when legal constraints were lifted 
after the abolishment of apartheid, and thus income mobility is now more 
dynamic in urban areas. As a result financial constraints are more important 
and population composition is less important in large cities. Wealthier house-
holds can move to well-off (that is, formerly white) residential areas to send 
their children to better schools, a practice that was formerly prohibited. This 
is happening in the areas surrounding large cities.
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quality of schooling, despite the fact that school quality largely depends on 
local resource availability. Government subsidies, if progressively allocated
to lower-quality schools with a poorer resource base, can potentially dis-
connect the linkage between local resources and school quality. To narrow 
the current imbalance, the government should increase financial and per-
sonnel support to disadvantaged locales and schools by targeting specific 
areas—as its progressive subsidy allocation has recently begun to do.
  If this direct option is limited owing to government budget constraints, 
alternative strategies may require the redistribution of fees from richer 
to poorer schools or the implementation of programs that more explicitly 
move certain kinds of children to better schools—including busing and school 
vouchers—as already adopted in developed countries.
  In this chapter I did not account for more qualitative factors, such as 
the quality of teachers and school management. It is puzzling why learner 
achievement in South Africa still differs so widely across population groups 
despite the equalization (albeit very gradual) of school inputs, such as those 
measured by LER. There is a need to pay equal or even greater attention to 
qualitative inputs within the school system, in addition to the highly progres-
sive subsidy allocations.
64  CHAPTER 3PART 2
Household Behavior
P
art 2 examines household behavior in human capital formation using 
micro panel data. Chapter 4 analyzes the formation of human capital 
from early-childhood nutrition intake to schooling investments and out-
comes. Chapter 5 examines adolescents’ transition from school to the labor 
market, with a particular focus on the effect of prime-age adult mortality 
shocks on their behavior. This chapter also provides evidence of increased 
prime-age mortality, which implies that the expected returns to human capi-
tal investments are being altered in South Africa.CHAPTER 4
Early-Childhood Nutrition, Schooling, 
and Sibling Inequality
H
uman capital takes a long time to accumulate; it passes through 
several phases from early childhood through higher education. While 
nutritional intake in early childhood forms the basis for a child’s 
health capital, which in turn provides a foundation for subsequent child 
development, investments in schooling augment the child’s knowledge capi-
tal, which is directly rewarded in advanced labor markets and in dealing with 
advanced production technologies.1 In this chapter I examine the effects of 
nutritional status and health capital in early childhood on schooling invest-
ments and outcomes, using recently available panel data from South Africa.
  The dynamic process of human capital development creates the possibil-
ity that investments in early childhood will influence the optimal amount and 
effectiveness of investments at later stages (Cunha et al. 2004). Several stud-
ies have attempted to identify the link between early-childhood nutritional 
status and schooling outcomes (for example, Glewwe, Jacoby, and King 2001; 
Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006) and adult outcomes (for example, 
Smith 2005; Behrman et al. 2006; Maluccio et al. 2009).2 In general, the way 
in which early-stage human capital investments determine the subsequent 
path of human capital accumulation and future income depends on (1) whether 
investments in different stages are mutual complements or substitutes and 
(2) the extent to which early investments and outcomes alter the environ-
ment, information, and preferences of children and parents in ways that 
affect investment decisions at later stages.
  To answer the question of whether early investments in children affect 
future outcomes requires an understanding of the complex interactions of mar-
ket forces and household behavior. First, there is an input-output relationship 
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1 For comprehensive discussions of the problem of child malnutrition in economic development, 
see Behrman, Alderman, and Hoddinott (2004).
2 Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2007) also found significant effects of birth weight on adult 
outcomes.between health and schooling in the human capital production function. For 
example, if health capital is an input in the schooling production function, 
enabling children to attend classes every day, whether health capital aug-
ments the productivity of schooling investments or substitutes for schooling 
inputs, it affects the optimal level of schooling investments.3 In the former 
case, I predict a cumulative process of widening inequality among siblings, 
given differences in nutritional status and health capital in early childhood, 
since healthy children tend to have better schooling outcomes. If parents 
are averse to sibling inequality in future earnings, however, they will make 
greater schooling investments in unhealthy children.
  Second, parents learn about potential returns to schooling investments from 
the outcomes of early-stage investments (in nutritional status and health, in 
our context) and make decisions regarding optimal investments at later stages. 
In these decisions, parents’ preferences concerning sibling inequality in human 
capital and future income matter. If parents are averse to inequality among 
their children, they may increase investments in the schooling of their less 
well-endowed children to equalize the children’s future incomes (Quisumbing, 
Estudillo, and Otsuka 2003). In the context of human capital production, since 
the outcomes of early-childhood investments signal the expected outcomes 
of investment at a later stage, parents can react to those signals by changing 
late-stage investments to maximize their objectives.
  Third, health capital, as well as schooling investments, generates positive 
economic returns, especially in the developing-country context (Strauss 1986; 
Haddad and Bouis 1991; Thomas and Strauss 1997). Therefore, health capital 
may increase opportunity costs for schooling investments (that is, higher 
wages), and it may affect intertemporal decisionmaking, creating heteroge-
neity in the effect of health capital on schooling investments.
  In empirically assessing this issue, we encounter challenging problems 
even with longitudinal data for children. The first problem arises from the 
potential endogeneity of nutritional status; fixed household-specific unobserved 
factors may affect both child health capital and schooling decisions, creating 
a positive correlation between them. To eliminate this problem, our approach 
requires household fixed effects, which base inference on (often small) sib-
ling variations.4
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3 Health capital is a part of human capital, measuring physical development and conditions in 
children (height, weight, and health status) but not including such endowments as inborn differ-
ences in intelligence.
4 The literature offers a few qualified empirical studies, which solve these problems. Employ-
ing longitudinal data for children from Zimbabwe, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2006) use 
civil war and drought periods that affected growth in children below the age of 3 to identify the 
effect of early-childhood malnutrition on schooling in a maternal fixed-effect model. This iden-  The next section describes the model. Human capital accumulation is 
modeled as a sequential process in which health is formed at an early stage 
and schooling investment is undertaken depending on health outcomes. Both 
health and knowledge (education) capital determine earnings in the labor 
market. The section on data discusses econometric issues, focusing on speci-
fication and identification strategy.
  Data and variables are described in the section “Outcomes at the Early 
Stage of Schooling.” To measure schooling outcomes, I use the 2004 KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study (round 3), which collected individual-level infor-
mation such as enrollment, age schooling started, grade completed, grades 
repeated, and expenditures from children aged 7–20.5 To supplement the 
main analysis, the survey also used the results of simple mathematics tests 
given to children aged 7–9 to measure their learning performance. Therefore, 
combined with the information on nutrition and health outcomes for children 
aged 1–5 available in the 1998 survey, I can investigate the effect of early-
childhood nutrition on schooling investments and outcomes of children aged 
6 years and above. One advantage of focusing on the early stages of schooling 
is the high enrollment rate at the primary school level, which minimizes a 
selectivity problem arising from time allocation decisions for children at later 
stages of schooling.
  The section “Outcomes at the Later Stage of Schooling” summarizes 
empirical results. First, data for siblings showing the effects of nutrition (as 
indicated by height) on the age schooling started and the grade completed 
demonstrate that for the majority, children of normal height (as measured by 
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tification strategy is based on findings that under credit-constrained circumstances, income 
shocks (such as drought and flood) change consumption, which affects child growth (Foster 
1995; Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001). Glewwe, Jacoby, and King (2001) take a similar approach to 
sibling estimation, using longitudinal data on Filipino children, but their identification strategy 
uses information on older siblings when the child was younger than 3 years. Alderman et al. 
(2000) use price data, interacted with parents’ education and child gender, as an instrument for 
child height growth in Pakistan. This chapter uses information on the availability of healthcare 
personnel in sample communities in 1993, right before most children in the 1998 sample were 
born. During South Africa’s transition to a democratic nation, the government implemented pro-
poor interventions in the health sector by building healthcare facilities and increasing the num-
bers of healthcare personnel. Our identification strategy uses these post-apartheid dynamics, 
captured by age (birth year), which differ across differently endowed communities.
5 The survey is representative in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which has the largest popu-
lation in the country. We do not have any reason for attributing our findings specifically to 
education systems in the province and the Zulu families in particular. For political reasons, 
however, this province experienced more violent turmoil than other provinces during the tran-
sition from apartheid to democracy, which delayed the implementation of the first national 
democratic election to 1995. This situation might have more adversely affected schooling 
behavior among children who entered school during the transition period in KwaZulu-Natal 
than in other provinces.height-for-age z-score) start school earlier, complete more grades, and repeat 
fewer grades. The analysis also identifies some outlying observations among 
taller children (who make up less than 5 percent of the sample) that show a 
negative effect of the height z-score on schooling outcomes. However, it also
remains highly possible that ages for these children in 1998 were under-
reported, so their height z-scores were overestimated. I also find that, although 
better nutrition and health status in early childhood improve primary school
outcomes, this positive effect diminishes over time as children age. The smaller 
effect observed among older siblings may also reflect the fact that the effect 
of nutrition on height is large among children aged less than 3 (in 1998), and 
height may rebound afterward.6
  Second, the analysis of mathematics test results, using the sample of chil-
dren aged 7–9, shows that health capital, measured by height in early child-
hood, has a significantly positive effect, implying that early-childhood nutrition 
affects learning performance at the early stage of transition to schooling.
Empirical Strategy
This section describes the empirical framework used to assess the effects 
of early-childhood health capital on schooling decisions and outcomes at a 
subsequent stage. The schooling equation is
  qijt = α + β1hijt–1Σβ1
Hhijt–1I(hijt–1 ∈ H) + Σβ1
ahijt–1I(aijt = a) +
 H  a 
  Σβ2
aI(aijt = a) + xijtγ + μi + φj + νijt,
 a
where i, j, and t denote household, child, and time, respectively, and qijt is 
schooling inputs or outcomes; hijt–1 is health capital, which is measured by the 
height-for-age z-score (formed at t – 1); aijt is the age of the child; xijt is a set 
of control variables; μi is a household-specific fixed effect; φj is child-specific 
fixed unobservables; and νijt is an error term.
  First, it is important to control the heterogeneity that arises from the cur-
rent ages. For example, cumulative years of grades repeated increases (but 
weakly) as children spend more time in school, that is, as their age increases. 
The score on the numerical tests also changes by age (and grade completed). 
In the analysis that follows, I assume that age structure in the sample of chil-
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6 Children aged 0–5 in the 1993 sample entered school during the transition period 1993–98, 
while children aged 1–5 in the 1998 sample entered school during the more stable period 1998–2004. 
This latter period was after basic school reforms had been introduced—that is, the South African 
School Act in 1996 and the National Norms and Standards for School Funding in 1998—though 
their implementation took longer. This change might have affected child schooling behavior and 
parents’ decisions.dren is exogenous; it is uncorrelated with shocks in schooling decisions and 
outcomes, an assumption which justifies the inclusion of age fixed effects.7
  Second, since it is highly likely that household-specific unobservables μi 
are correlated with hijt–1, OLS estimates of β1 are biased. This makes it neces-
sary to eliminate this component from the errors. For this purpose, I include 
household fixed effects to control μi. Therefore, the estimation is based on 
variations across siblings in the household (that is, within-sibling estimates).
  In the context of panel analysis, the inclusion of household fixed effects 
has another advantage regarding the attrition bias. Since we look only at
within-household variations, given household observations in the two rounds, 
we do not have to control for household-level attrition problems. Individual-
level attritions are investigated in the section “Data Sources” (see Table 4.3).
  With household fixed effects, however, we use only within-household 
variations from the sample of multiple-child households. Dropping observa-
tions from single-child households reduces the size of our sample, which 
potentially decreases the precision of parameter estimates in our analysis.
  Third, even with household fixed effects, we still encounter a potential 
problem of bias that may arise from a correlation between φj and hijt. To 
eliminate this correlation, it is necessary to use a set of instruments that 
explains the variations in hijt–1 but is uncorrelated with either φj or shocks in 
schooling investments and outcomes εijt. However, the necessity depends on 
the magnitude of covariations in differences among siblings in the z-score and 
schooling endowments.
  For this purpose, we use the information on whether each community 
(cluster) had different types of healthcare personnel—doctor, nurse, pharma-
cist, trained midwife, family planning worker, community healthcare worker, 
or traditional birth attendant—in t – 2 (1993 in our setting), interacted by child 
age.8 The 1993 initial condition of healthcare personnel availability should 
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7 Since we only use preschool children in the sample, we can exclude the possibility that par-
ents observe the schooling outcomes of older children before making reproductive (childbirth) 
decisions. However, as discussed, it is still possible that the health outcomes of older children 
in the preschool period affect reproductive decisions.
8 The data include information on the distance from the community to the nearest personnel if 
the community has no personnel. The data also have information on types of healthcare facili-
ties in the community, number of healthcare facilities, and if they do not exist, distance to the 
nearest one. In this chapter, however, we use only the indicator of whether communities had 
those personnel.
  In an early version, an instrument was constructed as follows. First, define the indicator, 
which has the value of one if children were less than 3 years old (inclusive) between the begin-
ning of 1994 and the end of 1995. The period before the age of 3 is regarded as that when 
a child’s growth is most sensitive to nutritional intake, which reflects economic conditions. 
This indicator is interacted with cluster fixed effects to capture possible heterogeneity in the 
impacts of the 1994–95 disturbances on child growth, I(Age 3 in year = 1994 or 1995) × cluster have affected subsequent changes in the numbers of community-level health-
care personnel after 1994, given the fact that South Africa has attempted to 
build healthcare facilities and increase the number of healthcare personnel in 
the post-apartheid period. However, it is hard to show quantitative evidence 
for this conjecture from our sample.
  In the following estimation, I interact child age with the initial number of 
healthcare personnel to capture dynamic changes in the personnel specific 
to a given community. For example, if a nurse was not in the community in 
1993, it is likely that the community would have nurses in the subsequent 
period. Therefore, the interaction between the initial availability of health-
care personnel and child age (cohort) captures community-specific changes 
in healthcare conditions.9 Another advantage of interacting the healthcare 
information with child age comes from the fact that nutrition input is most 
important in children under 3 years of age, an outcome measured by height 
in our context. The impact of healthcare on height differs by child age. The 
individual-level variations, created by age, make it feasible to examine intra-
household (within-sibling) variations in health and schooling outcomes in the 
household fixed-effect model.
  However, we also notice a possibility that dynamic changes in healthcare 
and education facilities are correlated, though both sets of changes were 
slow to occur at the beginning of the post-apartheid government. In the first 
stage, we are concerned with the impact of potential changes in health infra-
structure on the health outcomes of the sample children during the period 
1993–98, while their schooling outcomes were directly affected by changes 
in education infrastructure in 1998–2004. This time gap may justify the use 
of the 1993 initial health infrastructure data (personnel availability) as a 
potential source of intercommunity variations. However, to the extent that 
(changes in) healthcare facilities and schools are correlated, the proposed 
instrument is invalid.
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indicators. This period also corresponds to the abolishment of apartheid, so new economic 
opportunities were presented to the African population. On the other hand, unrest associated 
with the transition was particularly violent in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Thus there could 
have been positive impacts as well as negative ones. In addition, to capture the heterogene-
ity in the impacts related to the initial income level, the indicator is also interacted with total 
monthly household income in 1993. Although an F-test supports the joint significance of these 
instruments in explaining variations among siblings in height-for-age z-scores, a Hausman-Wu 
test rejects the relevance of these instruments. We observed some differences between within-
sibling OLS and within-sibling instrumental-variable estimates, but the magnitude did not alter 
the qualitative nature of our results.
9 Age distribution is potentially endogenous, correlated with private information on policy 
changes that parents might have had when the society moved into the post-apartheid regime. 
Parents might have changed reproductive behavior and their fertility might have changed; these 
factors affect birth timing and therefore the initial health conditions for their children.  In the analysis, I use the information on nurses, community healthcare 
workers, and traditional birth attendants since a preliminary examination sug-
gested that they are particularly important (that is, statistically significant). 
Since I also include age fixed effects when estimating schooling equations in 
the household fixed-effect model, the average cohort effects are controlled.
  I also use the weight-for-age z-score as an instrument to eliminate mea-
surement errors in the height z-score. Results will be compared between the 
two different sets of instruments.
  The first-stage regression results are shown in Table 4.1, where the identi-
fying instruments are jointly significant. Interestingly, the result (controlling 
for age fixed effects) implies that in communities with some nurses in 1993, 
younger children (those who were born more recently) have gained height 
relative to older children. On the other hand, older children have gained 
height (relative to younger children) in communities which had community 
healthcare workers and traditional birth attendants in 1993. The difference 
may imply some endogeneity of the initial allocation of healthcare person-
nel. However, the fact that I examine intrahousehold variations in child 
health outcome makes this issue less problematic. On the other hand, the 
weight-for-age z-score has a significant positive effect on the height-for-age 
z-score.
Data Sources
The analysis requires information from different points in time for the same 
individuals. In this chapter, I use data from the KIDS of 1993, 1998, and 2004 
(see Chapter 1). The sample was population self-weighted in the first round in 
1993, based on the 1991 population census, and enumeration-based weights 
were introduced in 1998. The 1993 and 1998 surveys provide information 
on anthropometric measures and health outcomes of children, enabling us 
to construct age-standardized z-scores for height. The 2004 survey provides 
some detailed information on schooling decisions and outcomes. Our analysis 
combines the nutritional status of pre-primary-school-age children in 1998 
and 1993 and their schooling inputs and outcomes until 2004.10
  In the principal analysis, I use as schooling variables (1) age schooling 
started, (2) grade completed (conditional on current age), (3) number of grades 
repeated, and (4) mathematics test results. For age schooling started, the 2004 
survey asks for the calendar year in which the child started primary school. 
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10 Constructing individual-level panel data from the 1998 and 2004 surveys, we have screened 
out observations recorded in multiple households (multiple memberships). The details of this 
procedure are available from the author.74  CHAPTER 4
Table 4.1  Height-for-age z-score
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)
Nurse × age  –0.2921
 (1.54)
Community health worker × age  0.8950
 (2.84)
Traditional birth attendant × age  0.2360
 (1.70)
Weight-for-age z-score   0.3546
   (2.59)
Age 8 years  0.2434  0.4288
 (0.54)  (0.96)
Age 9 years  –1.9111  –0.6920
 (2.56)  (1.64)
Age 10 years  –0.8080  –0.3939
 (1.67)  (0.95)
Age 11 years  –0.1691  0.2061
 (0.30)  (0.39)
Female 0.1526  0.0114
 (0.52)  (0.04)
Household fixed effects  Yes  Yes
F-statistic (all variables)  2.88  3.15
(p-value) (0.0062)  (0.0071)
F-statistic (identifying instrumental variable)  3.55  t-value above
(p-value) (0.0171) 
Within-household R2 0.1828  0.1524
Number of children  199  199
Number of households  88  88
Sources:   South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape 
Town (1994); University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy 
Research Institute  /  University of Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   The dependent variable is height-for-age z-score. Numbers in parentheses 
are absolute t-values. Estimation with household fixed effects uses children 
from households with multiple siblings. Specification includes over-age and 
under-age indicators for reported age in 1998. Sample consists of children 
aged 1–5 years in 1998, with consistent ages between 1998 and 2004, and 
height-for-age z-score in the range –6 to 6 in 1993. Age 7 years is omitted.
That year, compared with the current age in 2004, tells us the age at which 
the child started attending primary school.11
  Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of schooling outcome variables: 
age started school, the highest grade completed, and the cumulative number 
of grades repeated. First, the age started school increases as the current age 
11 In the principal analysis, we use only observations for which the estimated age schooling 
started was greater or equal to 4 years, restricting the sample to children who were aged less 
than 4 years.increases, which suggests that younger cohorts enter school at an earlier age. 
Second, the highest grade completed and the cumulative number of grades 
repeated also increase with the current age.
  In the mathematical tests, the team implemented four types of numerical 
tests for children aged 7–9: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. 
The four questions were 3 + 5 (addition), 7 – 3 (subtraction), 2 × 6 (multiplica-
tion), and 12 ÷ 4 (division). Table 4.3 reports the number of observations with 
correct and incorrect answers. Note that the sample size for each age group 
is nearly the same. First, the likelihood of giving a correct answer increases as 
age increases for all four questions. Second, the difficulty increases as we move 
from addition to division.
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Table 4.2  Descriptive statistics: Schooling
Age Age Grades  Grades
(years) started  school  completed  repeated
6 5.288  0.714  0.143
 (0.756)  (0.756)  (0.378)
7 5.693  0.894  0.256
 (0.922)  (0.689)  (0.597)
8 5.921  1.597  0.366
 (0.829)  (0.764)  (0.540)
9 6.150  2.443  0.343
 (0.989)  (1.049)  (0.563)
10 6.171  3.216  0.552
 (1.064)  (1.168)  (0.777)
11 6.048  4.123  0.628
 (1.434)  (1.398)  (0.876)
12 6.216  5.121  0.609
 (1.470)  (1.469)  (0.897)
13 6.220  6.038  0.616
 (1.281)  (1.480)  (0.946)
14 6.431  6.869  0.711
 (1.322)  (1.468)  (0.968)
15 6.485  7.559  0.925
 (1.282)  (1.445)  (1.047)
16 6.406  8.534  0.776
 (1.399)  (1.855)  (1.016)
17 6.516  9.036  1.195
 (1.511)  (1.790)  (1.241)
18 6.665  9.604  1.227
 (1.951)  (2.052)  (1.223)
19 7.189  9.875  1.263
 (1.772)  (1.815)  (1.186)
20 7.390  9.889  1.188
 (2.140)  (2.539)  (1.106)
Source:   University of KwaZulu-Natal (2004).
Notes:   Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. There are 
seven observations in the age 6 years group, though the Children 
Module of Section 12 targets children aged 7–20 years.  Table 4.4 reports the determinants of attrition from the 1998 to the 2004 
round and from the 1993 to the 2004 round (see Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and 
Moffitt 1998a, 1998b; Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith 2001). Since our prin-
cipal analysis focuses on variations among siblings, controlling for household 
fixed effects, attritions at the individual level are of interest. Given obser-
vations in the 1998 round, our concern here is to determine whether the 
probability of being observed in the 2004 round depends on explanatory vari-
ables used in the schooling investment and outcome equations. The sample 
is restricted to children from households found in 2004 who were between 
the ages of 1 and 5 in 1998 (0–5 in 1993) with height-for-age z-score values 
between     –6 and 6.
  In the attrition analysis, I use explanatory variables from the schooling 
equations: the height-for-age z-score, age indicators, and gender dummy, 
which are taken from either the 1993 or the 1998 round. To the extent that 
these predetermined variables are not correlated with attrition, we would 
not expect bias in estimates in the schooling equations owing to the attrition 
process. However, a possibility of attrition on unobservables still remains. For 
example, because of a correlation between shocks (unobservables) in the 
attrition and schooling equations, attrition on unobservables may cause addi-
tional bias in the schooling equations.12
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Table 4.3  Descriptive statistics: Mathematical 
test results
 Age  (years)
Test 7  8  9
Addition
  Correct  157  186  189
  Incorrect  61  27  16
Subtraction
  Correct  117  157  166
  Incorrect  101  56  39
Multiplication
  Correct  60  98  131
  Incorrect  158  115  74
Division
  Correct  15  44  77
  Incorrect  203  169  128
Number of observations  218  213  205
Source:   University of KwaZulu-Natal (2004).
12 Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffit (1998a, 1998b) discuss the issues of attrition on observables 
and unobservables and examine attrition problems in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  Specifications include household fixed effects with initial age and gen-
der indicators. Column 1 shows the 1998–2004 attrition rates by age and 
gender group. Attrition probability decreases as children age, which suggests 
a high mortality rate in early childhood; mobility of very young children as 
mothers, families, and households devise ways of providing childcare; or both. 
Columns 2 and 3 use household fixed effects based on the 1998 and 2004 
households, respectively. During the six-year interval between the two rounds, 
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Table 4.4  Attritions
 Percentage  attrition
 1998–2004  1993–2004
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Height-for-age z-score   0.0081  0.0045    0.0126
   (0.62)  (0.31)    (0.83)
Age 0 (less than 1 year old)        21.50
Age 1 year  13.27      24.39  –0.0256
         (0.34)
Age 2 years  11.11  0.0750  0.1585  19.70  0.0145
   (1.27)  (2.35)    (0.20)
Age 3 years  5.60  0.0632  0.1125  20.30  –0.0425
   (1.10)  (1.76)    (0.60)
Age 4 years  6.38  0.0636  0.0940  26.13  –0.0840
   (1.08)  (1.40)    (1.12)
Age 5 years  4.69  0.1176  0.1588  12.90  0.0082
   (1.88)  (2.29)    (0.11)
Female 7.84  –0.0503  –0.1069  18.03  0.0329
   (1.24)  (2.29)    (0.76)
Male 9.39      24.25
  Household fixed effects
   1998  2004    1998
Number of children    513  513    689
Number of attritions    44  44    145
Number of children in estimation    304  252    456
Number of households with multiple    121  108    181
  siblings   
Adjusted R2 (with household     0.1132  0.1121    0.2266
  dummies)   
Within-household R2   0.0291  0.0780    0.0145
Sources:   South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town (1994); Univer-
sity of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of Wisconsin–
Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   Dependent variable equals one if observed in 2004 and zero otherwise. Estimation uses the lin-
ear probability model. Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values. Sample consists of chil-
dren with height-for-age z-scores between –6 and 6 from households observed in both 1993 or 
1998 and 2004. Estimation uses children from households with multiple siblings. There were 44 
attritions out of 513 children and 145 attritions out of 689 children in the periods 1998–2004 
and 1993–2004, respectively. Age is defined as years old in the initial year, 1998 for columns 
1–3 and 1993 for columns 4 and 5, respectively.households were split and young people formed new households. The analysis 
in the next section uses the 2004 household definition, since decisions regard-
ing child schooling are supposed to be made in current household units.13 In 
both cases, age in 1998 affects the likelihood of being observed in 2004. This 
suggests that child mortality and mobility depend on the age of the child.
  Column 4 shows the 1993–2004 attrition rates. Age-specific attrition rates 
are higher than those in the 1998–2004 case, because we cover a longer 
period. We do not observe a clear relationship between attrition rate and 
initial age. In both cases, boys show a higher attrition rate than girls. Column 
5 reports determinants of attrition from 1993 to 2004. Contrary to the 1998–
2004 case, initial age is not significant.
  In the analysis of nutrition-height effects on schooling, we screen out 
observations of children that show ages inconsistent with the 2004 round. For 
example, age 8 in 2004 corresponds to age 1, 2, or 3 in 1998. Discrepancies 
arise from the timing of the surveys and birthdays.14 Mostly for this reason, 
sample size differs between the attrition analysis and the schooling analysis. 
Screening out observations of inconsistent ages between 1998 and 2004 with 
reference to ages reported in the 2004 survey, in particular, excludes large 
height-for-age z-scores as a result of understated ages in 1998.15 The same 
procedure is applied to age matching between 1993 and 2004. In the analysis 
of schooling outcomes, I include over-age and under-age indicators to control 
for the birthday effect, in addition to age fixed effects.
  In fixed-effect models, I use only observations of children from fixed-effect 
units with multiple children. For example, with household fixed effects, I use 
households with multiple siblings. This procedure excludes spurious observa-
tions from the estimation process.
Outcomes at the Early Stage of Schooling
Age Schooling Started
Table 4.5 shows the effect of the height-for-age z-score in 1998 on the age 
at which school was started. The sample consists of children aged 1–4 in 1998 
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13 Preliminary analysis shows that there are no significant differences even if we use the 1998 
units.
14 The 1998 survey asked for “approximate” current age, wording that I believe caused varia-
tions in reported age.
15 We find some negative effects of large height-for-age z-scores on schooling outcomes. One 
possibility is that ages were underreported in a previous round, a situation that causes over-
estimation of height-for-age z-scores for those children. However, by screening out observations 
with ages inconsistent between rounds, this possibility can be minimized.and aged 7 or above in 2004.16 Column 1 controls only cluster-level fixed 
effects, while Columns 2 and 3 report within-sibling estimates. The specifica-
tions include current age indicators to control cohort effects. In column 1, 
greater child height is found to significantly lower the age at which the child 
started school, though this estimate is likely to be biased owing to a correla-
tion between household-level factors and child height.
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Table 4.5  Age at which school was started
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Height-for-age z-score,  1998  –0.0827 –0.1367 –0.4790  –0.1477
  (2.87) (1.78) (1.98)  (1.10)
Female  –0.0474 –0.1766 –0.2957  –0.1805
  (0.47) (0.98) (1.28)  (0.98)
Current age fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Cluster fixed effects  Yes
Household fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes
Sargan overidentification (p-value)     13.052  n.a.
     (0.0015) 
Mean age started  6.0155  6.1717  6.1717  6.1717
Mean height-for-age z-score  –0.7164 –0.6892 –0.6892  –0.6892
Within-cluster R2 0.1763
Within-household R2   0.4541  0.2138  0.4539
Number of children  322  99  99  99
Number of groups  55  46  46  46
Sources:   South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town (1994); 
University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of 
Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   Dependent variable is age at which school was started. Numbers in parentheses are 
absolute t-values. Estimation with household (cluster) fixed effects uses children from 
households (clusters) with multiple children. Specifications include age fixed effects, 
and over-age and under-age indicators for reported age in 1998. Sample consists of 
children aged 1–4 years in 1998 and 7 years or above in 2004, with consistent ages 
between 1998 and 2004, height-for-age z-score in the range –6 to 6 in 1998, and age at 
which school was started equal to 4 years or above. In column 4, the equation is just 
identified. n.a. means not available.
16 Since older children are more likely to be already in school than younger children, this type 
of sample selection affects estimated height effects on age schooling started. If the height 
effect is positive, those who are relatively well endowed are likely to be dropped from the 
sample, especially among older children (ages 4 and 5). As a result, the selection biases the 
estimate upward (smaller in absolute value).
  The enrollment rates among children age 7 or above are quite high in this sample (KIDS round 
3, Section 12.2): 99.04 percent (age 7), 100 percent (age 8), 99.51 percent (age 9), 99.51 per-
cent (age 10), and 98.73 percent (age 11). Therefore, omitting children who had not started 
schooling is not consequential.  Column 2 confirms this finding, showing an even greater effect of height 
on age schooling started. The upward bias suggests that household-specific 
endowment (which increases the child’s age) is positively correlated with 
the height-for-age z-score. Column 3 shows the instrumental variables esti-
mation result, which implies upward bias owing to the correlation between 
individual-level endowment and the height-for-age z-score. It is also likely 
that the difference between columns 2 and 3 might have captured measure-
ment errors in the reported age schooling started. The marginal impact of the 
height-for-age z-score on the age schooling started is even larger in column 
3. To eliminate measurement errors, the weight-for-age z-score is used as 
an instrument in column 4. The parameter estimate is comparable to that in 
column 2, which suggests that measurement errors are not a large issue here. 
These results imply that early-childhood malnutrition delays the age at which 
a child starts school.17
  Current age does not influence age schooling started (not shown in the 
table), which suggests that the decision to start primary schooling did not 
change between 1998 and 2004.18 Thus there is no systematic change in the 
behavior of entering school across cohorts during the period.
Grade Completed
Table 4.6 reports the effects of the height-for-age z-score on years of school-
ing. As children have not completed schooling, specifications include age 
dummies which standardize years of schooling. Columns 1 and 2 compare 
estimates with cluster and household fixed effects. Though a positive sig-
nificant effect is found with cluster fixed effects, the effect is negative and 
insignificant with household fixed effects. In both cases, girls are more likely 
to advance grades than boys.
  To see slope differences, column 3 interacts the height-for-age z-score with 
an indicator which takes the value of one if the height-for-age z-score is above 
2 and zero otherwise. In this case, an improvement in the height-for-age 
z-score increases years of schooling completed, but the slope turns out to be 
negative at large values of the z-score (2–6). In column 4, I also include age 
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17 A preliminary analysis showed some potential nonmonotonicity in the effect of the height-for-
age z-score on the age schooling started. First, estimates of height effects on the age schooling 
started are significantly negative among relatively short children. Marginal gain (earlier age) 
from increasing height is greater among less well-endowed children. Second, the number of 
observations in these estimations suggests that the effect is negative and significant in more 
than 95 percent of the sample. Some outlying observations from exceptionally tall children (con-
ditional on age) change the estimates. This also holds in the analysis of grade completion and 
repetitions.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.interactions to investigate how the height effect changes as the child ages. 
The height-for-age z-score improves schooling while the effect becomes 
negative when the score is large. We also find that the effect diminishes as 
the child ages, particularly after age 9.
  To interpret these findings, we must take into account two possibilities. 
First, if age was underreported in 1998 for some reason, the expected years 
of schooling completed in 2004 would be smaller, which makes it more likely 
to find a negative estimate of the height effect among those large children. 
Second, we cannot deny the possibility that large children have a high oppor-
tunity cost of schooling as returns to their health capital are positive in the 
labor market or, more generally, in nonschool activities (though this point is 
not proven in this chapter). Note that the opportunity costs for those healthy 
children do not arise solely from strictly defined labor market activities, but 
also from nonschool activities, including informal work (usually not captured 
in statistics), household work, and crime.
  The concavity found previously also suggests that parents are averse to 
inequality among siblings. Given that healthy (taller) children earn more in 
the labor market, parents may invest more in less healthy (shorter) children 
to decrease the inequality in human capital and future earnings. Recall that 
the aversion to inequality may be traced to the concavity of the parents’ 
utility function.
  The observation that the height effect diminishes as the child ages sug-
gests another possibility. If it is height-for-age before age 3 which matters 
most and height may also rebound afterward, height at an older age (still ≤5 
years) explains fewer of the latter outcomes than height at earlier ages. Alter-
natively, if returns to height (health capital) increase as the child ages, the 
incentive to work (to study) increases (decreases).
  In columns 5–7, I compare within-sibling and within-sibling instrumental-
variable estimates using the sample of children with z-scores below 2. Col-
umn 6 uses as instruments the initial availability of healthcare personnel 
interacted with age, whereas column 7 uses the weight-for-age z-score. It 
is found in columns 5 and 6 that the instrumental-variable estimate for the 
height-for-age z-score effect is greater than the within-sibling effect, which 
suggests downward bias. Higher endowment in academic performance is 
negatively correlated with early-childhood health capital.19 Though the dif-
ference might have captured measurement errors in reported grades com-
pleted, this possibility is less likely than in the case of age schooling started. 
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19 Our result shows that higher health endowment discourages academic advancement, probably 
because there is another incentive for well-endowed children to participate in activities outside 
school.Column 7 shows a parameter estimate between those in columns 5 and 6, 
which implies that part of the downward bias is the result of measurement 
error attenuation, though the estimate is insignificant.
Grade Repetition
Table 4.7 summarizes the results on grade repetition. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative number of grades repeated. As in the previous section, all 
specifications include age fixed effects, which standardize years of repeti-
tion. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates with cluster and household fixed effects, 
respectively. The effect of the height z-score is insignificant in both cases. 
Consistent with the previous finding on grades completed, girls experience a 
smaller number of repetitions than boys.
  Column 3 includes slope differences of the height-for-age z-score (as 
defined previously) to capture possible changes in the slope. These are found 
to be insignificant. In column 4 I include age interactions in addition to the 
slope differences. Interestingly, we find positive effects on grades repeated at 
ages 9 and 10 and height-for-age z-scores above 2. Though these results are 
only marginally significant, they are consistent with previous findings regarding 
grade completed.
  In this chapter we cannot identify possible explanations for these findings. 
First, it is likely that for large children, ages were underreported in 1998, 
which leads to a positive estimate of the height effect among them. Second, 
we still cannot reject a hypothesis that the opportunity cost of schooling is 
high among large children because market and nonmarket returns to their 
health capital may be high.
Learning Outcomes
Table 4.8 reports the effects of height-for-age on mathematics test scores. 
In the 2004 survey we implemented four types of basic mathematics tests 
for children aged 7–9. For each question, an indicator is constructed to take 
the value of one if the answer is correct and zero otherwise (the descriptive 
statistics are given in Table 4.1).
  Table 4.8 shows probit results with cluster fixed effects in columns 1–4.20 
Significantly positive effects are found in addition and subtraction—relatively 
easy computations. The point estimate decreases as the difficulty of calcula-
tion advances. In addition, age has a significant positive effect on the prob-
ability of answering correctly, which implies that schooling improves learning 
performance.
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20 Within-sibling estimation did not provide precise estimates owing to a small sample of chil-
dren from households with multiple siblings in the 7–9 age group.  Column 5 lists the number of total correct answers. Consistent with previ-
ous results, an increase in the height-for-age z-score as well as age improves 
learning performance. However, these estimates are potentially biased owing 
to omitted household factors, which are correlated with the height-for-age 
z-scores.
Outcomes at the Later Stage of Schooling
This section summarizes our findings on the effects of children’s height-for-age 
z-score in 1993 on schooling outcomes in 2004. Before discussing the results, we 
note that South African education was in transition from apartheid to democ-
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Table 4.7  Grade repetition
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Haz 0.0126  0.0457  –0.0134  –0.0907
  (0.69) (1.16) (0.24) (0.97)
Haz × I (Haz 2–6 years)      0.1390  0.2095
     (1.50)  (1.95)
Haz × age 8 years        –0.0119
       (0.11)
Haz × age 9 years        0.2390
       (1.71)
Haz × age 10 years        0.2120
       (1.88)
Haz × age 11 years        –0.0277
       (0.20)
Female  –0.2599 –0.3022 –0.3115 –0.2689
  (4.11) (2.46) (2.56) (2.13)
Current age fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Cluster fixed effects  Yes
Household fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes
Mean dependent variable  0.4336  0.4452  0.4452  0.4452
Mean  Haz  –0.7170 –0.5106 –0.7170 –0.7170
Within-cluster R2 0.1382
Within-household R2   0.2378  0.2599  0.3301
Number of children  399  155  155  155
Number of groups  60  71  71  71
Sources:   University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of 
Wisconsin-Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   Dependent variable is cumulative number of grades repeated. Numbers in parentheses 
are absolute t-values. Estimation with household (cluster) fixed effects uses children 
from households (clusters) with multiple children. Specifications include age fixed 
effects and over-age and under-age indicators for reported age in 1998. Sample consists 
of children aged 1–5 years, with consistent ages between 1998 and 2004, and height-
for-age z-score in the range –6 to 6 in 1998. Haz means height-for-age z-score, 1998; 
I means indicator function.racy during the period 1993–98. The South African School Act and the Norms 
and Standards for School Funding were announced in 1996 and 1998, respec-
tively; these introduced compulsory nonsegregated education throughout the 
system (although the reforms would take some time to have an effect).
  It is also important to note that by 2004, this group of children was in 
transition from primary to secondary education. This may create heterogene-
ity by age in the effects of the height-for-age z-score on schooling outcomes. 
Therefore, it is important to examine possible variations in the height effect 
by age. The role of positive returns to health is expected to be greater among 
older children than younger children.
  Table 4.9 shows the effects of the height-for-age z-score on grades com-
pleted and repeated. All the specifications control household fixed effects 
(using sibling variation within a household). Column 1 has only the height 
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Table 4.8  Mathematical test results: Cluster fixed effects
   Linear
         Total 
 Addition  Subtraction  Multiplication  Division  correct
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Haz 0.1934  0.1363  0.0794  0.0579  0.1046
 (3.10)  (2.47)  (1.53)  (1.02)  (2.61)
Age 8 years in 2004  0.9223  0.6781  0.9498  0.6686  0.8148
 (3.49)  (2.94)  (3.92)  (2.22)  (4.54)
Age 9 years in 2004  1.3734  1.4401  1.8873  1.4923  1.4263
 (4.40)  (5.23)  (6.81)  (4.99)  (7.61)
Female –0.0392  –0.2702  –0.2436  –0.1616  –0.1551
 (0.17)  (1.31)  (1.19)  (0.75)  (1.06)
Cluster fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Mean dependent variable  0.8169  0.6796  0.4507  0.1901  2.1373
Mean Haz  –0.7587  –0.7587  –0.7587  –0.7587  –0.7587
Pseudo R2 0.2594  0.2210  0.2720  0.2092
Within-cluster R2         0.2192
Number of observations  209  239  235  224  284
Number of groups          54
Sources:   University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of 
Wisconsin-Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values. Sample consists of children aged 7–9 years in 
2004 and with consistent ages between 1998 and 2004. Specifications include age fixed effects 
and over-age and under-age indicators for reported age in 1998. Though probit estimation 
with cluster dummies (columns 1–4) automatically omits observations from clusters in which it 
perfectly predicts the dependent variable, the computation of dependent and height-for-age 
z-score means includes those clusters. Haz means height-for-age z-score, 1998.
Probitz-score, which shows its insignificance. Age heterogeneity is controlled in col-
umn 2. It is interesting to note again that an improvement in the height-for-
age z-score marginally increases years of schooling completed, but it is likely 
to decrease grades completed as children age (conditional on age). Greater 
health capital may discourage further schooling from the primary stage to the 
secondary stage, given the positive returns to health in the labor market. It 
is also possible that height at ages older than 3 years may not have a posi-
tive direct effect on schooling attainment. To confirm the robustness of this 
finding, column 3 includes slope differences on the height-for-age z-score. 
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Table 4.9  Grades completed and repeated, 1993 sample
  Grades completed  Grades repeated
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Haz  0.0545  0.2492  0.2388  0.0101 –0.1978 –0.1974
  (1.03) (1.95) (1.87)  (0.21) (1.73) (1.71)
Haz × age 12 years    –0.3639  –0.4111    0.1979  0.1995
   (2.21)  (2.44)   (1.35)  (1.32)
Haz × age 13 years    –0.2088  –0.2746    0.2157  0.2180
   (1.41)  (1.74)   (1.63)  (1.54)
Haz × age 14 years    –0.1016  –0.1537    0.3352  0.4085
   (0.56)  (0.83)   (2.07)  (1.46)
Haz × age 15 years    –0.2641  –0.3265    0.2771  0.2793
   (1.46)  (1.75)   (1.72)  (1.66)
Haz × age 16 years    –0.1004  –0.0870    0.2602  0.2598
   (0.44)  (0.39)   (1.25)  (1.25)
Haz × I (Haz 2–6 years)      0.1841      –0.0064
     (1.24)     (0.05)
Female  0.6023  0.6320  0.6492  –0.3798 –0.3907 –0.3913
  (4.05) (4.19) (4.30)  (2.86) (2.89) (2.87)
Age  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Household  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Mean  dependent  variable  6.4781 6.4781 6.4781  0.6764 0.6764 0.6764
Mean  Haz  –0.9441 –0.9441 –0.9441  –0.9477 –0.9477 –0.9477
Within-household R2  0.7689 0.7799 0.7825  0.1342 0.1685 0.1685
Number  of  children  251 251 251  247 247 247
Number  of  households  108 108 108  106 106 106
Sources:   South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town (1994); 
University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of 
Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values. Estimation with household fixed effects uses 
children from households with multiple siblings. Specifications include age fixed effects and over-
age and under-age indicators for reported age in 1993. Sample consists of children aged 0–5 
years in 1993, with consistent ages between 1993 and 2004, and height-for-age z-score in the 
range –6 to 6 in 1993. Haz means height-for-age z-score, 1993; I means indicator function.Contrary to the previous findings from younger children (and cohorts), non-
linearity is not found. We also find heterogeneity by age.
  Columns 4–6 report on grade repetition. In column 5, similar to the results
on grade completion, the height-for-age z-score has a negative effect among the 
youngest group (age 11), but the marginal effect becomes positive among 
older groups. This finding suggests that (conditional on age) greater health 
capital may discourage further investments in schooling at the transition from 
primary to secondary school. Column 6 investigates potential nonlinearity by 
introducing slope differences, which again show insignificant slope heteroge-
neity in grade repetition.21
  In both grades completed and repeated, girls perform better than boys. 
However, a preliminary analysis shows that gender does not matter in the 
effect of the height-for-age z-score on these schooling outcomes (that is, the 
interaction is insignificant).
Summary
This chapter examined the effect of early-childhood health capital on school-
ing investments and outcomes, using panel data from South Africa. Good 
nutrition and health in early childhood are thought to be a precondition for 
child development and school learning at subsequent stages.
  Nutrition intake and health capital in early childhood, measured by the 
height-for-age z-score of pre-primary-school-age children, enhance schooling 
investments and improve the outcomes. That is, children who are well nour-
ished and in good health start school at an earlier age, progress further, and 
repeat fewer grades.
  We also found that some taller children (z-scores above 2) perform worse 
than shorter children, but since the number of observations for this segment 
in our sample is very small and ages might have been underreported, it is dif-
ficult to generalize this nonlinearity. It is also important to note that differ-
ent cohorts in our sample experienced certain historical changes in the South 
African education system, which might account for the age heterogeneity in 
the height effect.
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21 An alternative possibility is that the 1993 data are somehow flawed, causing these results. 
However, judging from the age consistency with the 2004 round, I conclude that the 1993 data 
are more accurate than the 1998 data.CHAPTER 5
Impacts of Prime-Age Adult Mortality 
on Adolescents’ Labor Supply
I
t is widely recognized that prime-age adult mortality has increased dra-
matically in many African countries. This drastic demographic change is 
largely attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (for example, Epstein 2004). 
Excess mortality is concentrated among women between the ages of 25 and 
39 and among men between the ages of 30 and 44 (Timaeus and Jasseh 2004). 
The micro foundations for such increases in adult mortality can be found in 
studies of the sexual activities and marriage decisions of young adults (Munshi 
and Myaux 2002; Hallman 2004; Oster 2005; Yamauchi 2007b; Ueyama and 
Yamauchi 2009).
  Households can respond to an increase in mortality among prime-age adults in
many ways. They can use government grants and formal insurance to smooth 
their income; they can engage in ex ante and ex post risk-coping or -mitigating
strategies (for example, borrowing or relying on remittances) to buffer shocks; 
they can develop foster-care arrangements or income-diversification strate-
gies). There are, however, problems with these approaches. If these strategies 
are imperfect in smoothing consumption, prime-age adult death can decrease 
child schooling investments and increase the labor supply, at least in the 
short run. Moreover, prime-age adult death also reduces the expected future 
earnings for the household. This in turn reduces investments in child school-
ing, given that the period over which capital is formed is long and the loan 
market is imperfect. Typically, growth in the number of orphans in a society 
is taxing on both families and the society (see Kelly 2000 quoted in Bennell 
2005, 473), and an increase in mortality among prime-age adults, unlike mor-
tality in other age groups, directly reduces the capability of households to 
secure income.
  Motivated by recent increases in prime-age adult mortality in South Africa, 
we use recently available panel data to assess the impacts of such mortality on 
labor supply behavior in nonagricultural settings by examining the transition 
88of adolescents from school to the labor market and examining female labor 
supply decisions.
  The issue at hand in this chapter is of increasing importance to contem-
porary Africa. The death of adults in their productive years raises serious 
concerns about the pervasive impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on household 
behavior and on human capital development, particularly through education 
and labor supply decisions. Since the onset of HIV/AIDS more than two decades 
ago, mortality rates in many Sub-Saharan African countries have escalated
dramatically. In South Africa, according to Statistics South Africa (2005), 
the number of annual recorded deaths in the 20–45 age group more than 
doubled between 1997 and 2002, from a little less than 90,000 to more than
190,000. Though explicit reports of HIV/AIDS as a cause of death are compara-
tively low, the number of HIV/AIDS deaths increases sharply when the under-
lying causes of the disease are taken into account: HIV/AIDS would account 
for nearly half of all deaths in South Africa (Groenewald et al. 2005). Over 70 
percent of the deaths among those 15–49 years old can be attributed to HIV/
AIDS, according to one model (Dorrington et al. 2006, ii, 21).
  The next section, which deals with mortality changes, presents evidence 
of excess mortality among prime-age adults in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, 
using a particular dataset. The panel data I use throughout this chapter have 
been collected primarily from households in this province.
  The main focus of our study is on adolescents’ transition from school to 
the labor market and on changes in the time allocation between household 
production and labor-market activities, potentially as a response to prime-age 
adult mortality and as part of households’ optimal risk-mitigation strategies. 
While I stress that responses to prime-age adult mortality are not only ex post 
but could also be ex ante (that is, before the adult’s death), adult mortal-
ity would have a series of effects.1 It has long-term implications for human 
capital formation if it causes an acceleration of adolescents’ transition to 
the labor market (see, for example, Young 2005); in turn, to the extent that 
prime-age adult mortality produces children (for example, orphans) who can-
not receive enough education and therefore participate in the labor market, 
HIV/AIDS creates inequalities in human capital (and earnings) between those 
affected and those unaffected.
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1 I have provided evidence (Yamauchi 2006) that marriage as an institution plays a role in miti-
gating AIDS risks; this implies that marriage could be an ex ante response to potential prime-age 
adult mortality. That paper shows that, because of interactions between marriage and labor 
markets, schooling may increase excess mortality among women, but not men. Along the same 
lines, Ueyama and Yamauchi (2009) report that marriage behavior has been changing in response 
to regional-level prime-age adult mortality shocks in Malawi.  On a shorter time horizon, the transition affects the unemployment rate 
among the young if, as a consequence of their exit from the school system, 
they are insufficiently educated. Another effect is on adult household mem-
bers, who survive the crisis and accommodate the mortality shocks by chang-
ing their time allocation. For example, household members may need to look 
for earning opportunities in the labor market or may move to household work 
to care for the ill.2 In the analysis that follows, I investigate these issues in 
detail, acknowledging the possibility that the behavioral response to adult 
mortality may differ by gender.
  A number of recent studies attempt to identify the impacts of prime-age 
adult mortality on child schooling and labor supply (for example, Ainsworth, 
Beegle, and Koda 2005; Yamano and Jayne 2005). Though I subsequently 
detail the main relevant findings of these studies, and note that they vary 
greatly in their methodologies, the point is that they demonstrate the impor-
tance of prime-age adult deaths in determining child school enrollment and 
attendance. In the literature, however, the impact on labor supply is less 
visible than that on child schooling (Beegle 2005). Because we identify labor 
supply effects, our contribution to the literature is important in this regard. 
Also, whereas most of these studies share motivations similar to ours, they 
deal with agricultural settings. In contrast, our sample comes from semi-
industrialized settings in South Africa, where the dominant income source for 
households is wage employment (see, for example, Dieden 2004). These dif-
ferences provide a set of risk-coping and -mitigating strategies distinct from 
those in other rural contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. They also justify our focus 
on labor supply and schooling decisions.
  This chapter is structured as follows. The section “Mortality Change” pro-
vides evidence of excess mortality in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The data 
used for this chapter come from KIDS rounds 2 and 3, conducted in 1998 and 
2004, respectively. “Impact of Prime-Age Adult Mortality on Schooling and 
Labor Supply” sets the empirical framework for our analysis. The next two 
sections respectively describe activity transitions in the sample and present 
our empirical results.
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2 Though these phenomena occur at the micro level, it is often argued at the macro level that 
prime-age adult mortality resulting from HIV/AIDS causes labor shortages. However, with high 
unemployment rates, as observed in South Africa, labor shortages may not occur if the degree 
of (skill) substitutability between the dying and the unemployed is high. Even in agricultural 
household production, where this causality looks rather straightforward, the degree of substitu-
tion between household members and hired labor matters. However, if female household mem-
bers engage in a shift, there might then be a decrease in their time input to child education in 
the family. Therefore, changes in labor supply might affect human capital formation over the 
medium run.  Several findings emerge from the analysis. I find first that deaths of prime-
age working adults significantly increase the labor supply of both male and 
female adolescents, stopping their schooling. Deaths of prime-age adults in 
the future decrease female school enrollment, suggesting that girls shift activ-
ity, possibly staying at home to take care of the sick or of the household more 
generally. Second, since the enrollment of male adolescents is decreased prior 
to the death of a working adult, their response is different, intended to com-
pensate for an income loss. These findings imply that excess mortality among 
prime-age adults disrupts human capital formation in the society.
Mortality Change
The 2004 KIDS data allow us to link death with specific changes among house-
hold members, because the data contain retrospective information on those 
who died between 1998 and 2004. More specifically, the data allow an identi-
fication of the individuals who died and when the death occurred. (However, 
to minimize emotional distress, respondents were not asked about deaths 
when these had occurred up to three months prior to the 2004 survey.) Com-
bining this information with the roster information on individuals in 1998, I 
can identify the age at death. This information is critical for our analysis as 
it enables us to identify changes over the period 1998–2004. This corresponds 
to the time when South Africa experienced substantial increases in prime-age 
adult mortality (for example, Groenewald et al. 2005; Statistics South Africa 
2005). In other words, the period covered is quite appropriate to identify 
the impacts of prime-age adult mortality on the time allocation decisions of 
children and housewives.
  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the changes in mortality rates between 1998 
and 2004 for the populations of males and of females, respectively. One of 
the two series plotted on the figures presents information gathered from the 
surveyed households. The changes are reported across age groups. Each fig-
ure illustrates the non-AIDS mortality rate for South Africa as one of the two 
series. These data are from the 2002 model estimates of the Actuarial Society 
of South Africa (ASSA) for 1996 and for all racial groups. Data for 1996 were 
chosen to provide a credible non-AIDS mortality rate relative to the period 
spanned by the KIDS data. Age-specific non-AIDS mortality rates for men and 
women are the benchmark rates against which the KIDS mortality rates—
the second data series in Figures 5.1 and 5.2—are considered in this section 
(see Table 5.1). Since the sample period I consider spans six years, the mor-
tality rate of the KIDS household members over the period is converted into 
annual terms assuming a constant mortality rate throughout the period. The 
two figures show significant increases in adult mortality for those aged 20–44 
across gender—the gap between the two lines in the two figures reflects 
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KIDS mortality rate (1998–2004)
Non-AIDS mortality rate for
1996 (from ASSA 2002 model)
Age (years)
Figure 5.1  Mortality rate: Male
Sources:   Actuarial Society of South Africa (2002); University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International 
Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).
Annual mortality rate (percentage points)








KIDS mortality rate (1998–2004)
Non-AIDS mortality rate for
1996 (from ASSA 2002 model)
Age (years)
Figure 5.2  Mortality rate: Female
Sources:   Actuarial Society of South Africa (2002); University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International 
Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).excess mortality in the KIDS sample at the end of the 1990s for each age 
group. The figures also show that excess mortality is higher for males than 
for females.3
  Table 5.1 reports the probit results on individual-level mortality, control-
ling for the age-specific non-AIDS mortality rates. The non-AIDS mortality rate 
is that from the ASSA 2002 model. This variable is included to control for the 
pre-AIDS level of mortality rate. The various results incorporate cluster fixed 
effects (columns 1–4), allow for household random effects (columns 5–7), and 
finally incorporate household fixed effects (columns 8–10).
  Column 1 reports the results using only the non-AIDS mortality rate and a 
gender dummy. The results confirm that the benchmark non-AIDS level of mor-
tality significantly explains mortality over the period 1998–2004, though the 
gender dummy is insignificant. Column 2 introduces age-group indicators to 
capture age-specific changes in mortality during the period. With those aged 
15–19 as the omitted group, we find significant increases in mortality among 
those aged 20–44. Households faced some exogenous changes in prime-age 
adult mortality among those aged 20–44 over the period. To distinguish age-
specific mortality changes between men and women, columns 3 and 4 report 
the results of separate estimations by gender. The results show that there 
are larger increases in mortality among men than among women, particularly 
among men aged 30 and older. However, during the period under study, those 
aged 20–44 experienced significant increases in mortality across both groups.
  Given that these findings might have been generated by unobservable 
household-specific factors correlated with the household demographic struc-
ture, I alter the model specifications. Columns 5–7 report the results of probit 
regressions for the within-household incidence of mortality with household 
random effects. Columns 8–10 use household fixed effects in linear models. 
Both the random-effect and fixed-effect estimates show qualitatively similar 
effects of the age indicators and individual characteristics. Yet the signifi-
cance of parameter estimates in the fixed-effect estimates is slightly lower 
than that for the random-effect probit results.
  These results are important: they confirm that those between 20 and 44 
years of age in 1998 were more likely to die than others in each household. 
Increases in the incidence of mortality among the prime-age adults should 
cause a reallocation of resources within the household, including changes in 
time allocation among household members. This effect arises as household 
members seek to mitigate the negative impacts of adult mortality on house-
hold welfare.
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3 It is generally agreed that female mortality is higher than that for males. It is possible that 
male migrant workers came back home to die, which increases the estimate of the excess mor-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Impact of Prime-Age Adult Mortality on Schooling 
and Labor Supply
Prime-Age Adult Mortality and Labor Supply
A handful of studies examine the impact of prime-age adult mortality on 
labor supply. With the HIV/AIDS epidemic striking most men and women at 
their prime age, an investigation of this phenomenon remains a necessity in 
developing countries generally and in South Africa in particular. Some studies 
focus on this impact in countries where the labor supply is largely within the 
agricultural sector. In contrast, very few studies examine this impact within 
the nonagricultural sector. The key focus of this chapter is the examination 
of changes in the time allocation of adolescents who experience prime-age 
adult death or illness in their households. In order to smooth household con-
sumption and income, adolescents exit school and enter the labor market 
(whether employed or unemployed), and female household members alter 
their labor force participation.
  A few studies empirically examine the impact of AIDS mortality on labor 
supply. An analysis of two LFSs (1990–91 and 2000–01) in Tanzania undertaken 
by Wobst and Arndt (2004) revealed an important trend in this regard; the 
data suggest a dramatic increase in labor force participation rates for chil-
dren aged 10–14, from 23 percent to 46 percent, implying a tendency to exit 
primary schools over the decade. This chapter is similar to their paper in that 
I focus on adolescents’ time allocation. However, I explore this issue using 
micro-longitudinal data instead of the aggregate measures that are used in 
their analysis.
  There are two studies on this topic from dominantly agrarian settings: Bee-
gle (2005) and Donovan et al. (2003). Using panel data from Tanzania, Beegle 
(2005) explores how prime-age adult mortality affects the time allocation of 
surviving household members and the portfolio of household farming activi-
ties. The author analyzes hours spent farming and on household chores across 
demographic groups and finds small and insignificant changes in the labor 
supply of individuals in households that experience a prime-age adult death. 
While some farm activities are temporarily scaled back and wage employment 
falls after a male death, households did not shift cultivation away from sub-
sistence farming. Moreover, they did not appear to reduce their diversification 
of income sources more than six months after a death.
  Donovan et al. (2003) analyze the effects of prime-age adult morbid-
ity and mortality in rural Rwanda using recent data from household surveys 
with overlapping samples and retrospective information on deaths within the 
household. They show that loss of agricultural labor was most pronounced 
for tasks involving cropping and animal husbandry relative to other potential 
96  CHAPTER 5effects (for example, diet effects, effects on children, and other income-
generating effects).
  Our empirical setting is different from that of these two studies in that 
most of the sample households supply labor in nonagricultural sectors. That 
is, intrahousehold decisions on labor allocation for self-employment, such as 
own farming, are not the issue. With a focus on trade-offs between human 
capital investments and labor supply, I analyze labor force participation deci-
sions among adolescents without distinguishing between the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors.
Prime-Age Adult Mortality and Child Schooling
It is widely believed that the death of a parent and prime-age household 
member has serious repercussions on the well-being and future of children—
their schooling in particular. However, the literature on this topic does not 
necessarily present similar results, partly because of differences in method-
ologies across studies.
  First, the literature is divided into two groups of studies: those using panel 
data and those based on cross-sectional data. The studies that used panel data 
can potentially identify ex ante and ex post effects of prime-age adult mortal-
ity on child schooling.
  Second, the focus of studies may be parental deaths (leading to orphan-
hood) or prime-age adult deaths in general. Since the two are not exclusive, 
studies could basically analyze both impacts, but this portion of the literature 
is generally divided into two groups, with relative emphasis on either paren-
tal deaths or prime-age deaths. This chapter sheds light on both issues using 
panel data.
  Approaches and findings from the literature are summarized in Table 5.2.
  Five studies use panel data: Ainsworth, Beegle, and Koda (2005); Yamano 
and Jayne (2005); Beagle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2006); Case and Ardington 
(2006); and Evans and Miguel (2007). All of these studies, except Beegle, De 
Weerdt, and Dercon (2006), used standard methods of panel analysis with 
children in similar age ranges. Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2006) used 
children aged 0–15 who had not experienced parental deaths in the baseline 
to track their completed years of schooling and anthropometric measures 
later in their lives, under the assumption that parental deaths were not pre-
dictable and also not correlated with the health and schooling of children in 
the initial round. In this respect, although they used panel data, it is not 
straightforward to compare their results with others.
  As Table 5.2 shows, with the exception of Yamano and Jayne (2005), all 
studies analyzed the effects of parental deaths. However, Ainsworth, Beegle, 
and Koda (2005) and Yamano and Jayne (2005) are the only studies that directly 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.analyzed the effects of prime-age adult deaths. In all studies, both ex ante 
and ex post impacts are studied.
  Of the two studies that highlight the effects of prime-age adult mortality, 
both report that the ex ante effect of prime-age adult deaths—hours at school 
in Ainsworth, Beegle, and Koda (2005) and school attendance in Yamano and 
Jayne (2005)—is significantly negative. As discussed subsequently, our results 
also show significant ex ante effects on adolescents’ transition from school 
to labor markets (that is, changes in enrollment status).
  The other studies which focus on parental deaths (Case and Ardington 
2006; Evans and Miguel 2007) show that a mother’s death has a more signifi-
cant and strongly negative impact on child schooling than a father’s death. 
This chapter, however, shows that both mothers’ and fathers’ deaths have 
almost equal impacts on adolescents’ decisions regarding the continuation of 
schooling.
  One caveat in these comparisons arises from differences in the child age 
range between the present study and the other studies in the literature (see 
the third column in Table 5.2). In our sample from South Africa, enrollment 
status does not show any cross-sectional variations among children below age 
13 at the primary-school level, partly because of the tendency of children 
to remain enrolled even if they participate in some other activities. In this 
sense, more sophisticated measures of schooling, such as attendance, should 
be used, but I decided not to pursue this line of investigation since the 1998 
data do not include such information.
  Three studies used cross-sectional data: Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger 
(2004), Ainsworth and Filmer (2006), and Ardington and Leibbrandt (2010). 
Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger (2004) and Ardington and Leibbrandt (2010) used 
within-household variations to address the relative status of orphans who lost 
their parent(s). The former study shows that orphans’ enrollment is lower than 
that of non-orphans within the same household, though residence arrangement 
is an endogenous choice. If orphans become better off by moving into other 
households (for example, those of relatives who have not experienced parental 
death) after losing their parent(s), their status is overestimated in this method
—which, however, only strengthens the findings. Using within-household varia-
tions, Ardington and Leibbrandt (2010) found that maternal death has a larger 
effect on years of schooling and enrollment than paternal death—a finding in 
line with those from other studies using panel data.
  Ainsworth and Filmer’s (2006) results are not clear. Using data from 51 
countries, they report that orphans’ enrollment status is not significantly 
lower than that of non-orphans in many countries—but as they acknowledge, 
this could be attributed to the failure in their methodology to account for 
socioeconomic factors that determine orphan status.
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data. Owing to data constraints (explained earlier), I focus on the enrollment 
status of adolescents aged 14–19 in the baseline and their transitions to labor 
markets thereafter. Though our results in general conform to those in the 
literature, one difference is the finding of almost equal magnitudes of ex post 
effects of maternal and paternal deaths, partly as a result of difference in 
the age ranges used. Because of small incidences of parental deaths in a short 
period, it was not possible to estimate the ex ante effects.
Framework
Specification and Estimation
This section describes our empirical methodology. The behavioral equation of 
interest to us is as follows:
  y* ijt = α + xjtβ + γsit0 + δait0 + μij + εijt, (5.1)
where, for individual i in household j at time t, our observable activity indi-
cator yijt = 1 (enrolled in school or engaged in housework) if latent variable 
y* ijt ≥ 0 and yijt = 0 (in labor market) otherwise, xjt is a vector of household-
level factors including the demographic composition of the household, sit0 is 
the highest grade completed in the initial period t0, ait0 is age at the initial 
period t0, μij is individual i’s fixed effect in household j, and εijt follows the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function (probit) or the logistic cumu-
lative distribution function (logit). As I discuss subsequently, I use conditional 
logit estimation to eliminate time-invariant factors in the analysis of dynamic 
activity transition.4
  Although schooling level and age in the initial period are controlled for in 
equation (5.1), these time-invariant variables in addition to unobserved fixed 
effects do not contribute to the estimation of the transition equation. There-
fore, in the estimations carried out next I include initial age and schooling fixed 
effects only when estimating the prime-age adult mortality effect in cross-
sectional models to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity of labor 
supply behavior attributable to predetermined schooling attainment and age.5
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4 Although multinomial logit estimation is also applicable in this context to capture participation 
in (1) school (adolescents) or housework (adult females), (2) the labor market, and (3) other 
activities, I decided to focus on (1) and (2) since the number of observations for (3) is very small 
in our sample of individuals in specific age ranges. The inclusion of observations for other activi-
ties destabilizes the parameter estimates in maximum likelihood estimation.
5 Including both initial schooling and age fixed effects indirectly controls for the effect of past 
grade repetitions on the labor supply. Correlations  between  xjt and μi bias estimates of β. To solve this problem, 
I focus on changes in activity (for example, transitions from school to the 
labor market) over time. More specifically, I adopt the conditional (fixed-
effect) logit model to eliminate μij (Chamberlain 1984).6 The process involves 
first differencing the right-hand-side variables, which produces Δxj. This term 
captures changes in households’ demographic composition; in our setting it 
represents the death of prime-age adult members.
Potential Endogeneity of Prime-Age Adult Mortality
The endogeneity of adult mortality is not perfectly resolved, as we may 
potentially have E[Δxjεi1] = E[xj2εi1] ≠ 0. (See also Beegle 2005 for a detailed 
discussion of potential endogeneity problems of adult deaths.) To illustrate 
the problem, we can take the example of a drop in household income that 
is caused by a death and which causes dropouts from school in a context of 
credit constraints. The income drop at the initial stage could worsen subse-
quent living conditions. The worsened living conditions can, in turn, contrib-
ute to adult mortality. Therefore, the income drop can cause adult mortality 
and child dropouts from school.
Ex Ante Response, Selectivity, and Transition
In the case of HIV/AIDS-related mortality, it is possible that foreseeing the 
death of AIDS-infected family members causes other members to adjust to 
the negative impacts ex ante, for instance by increasing the labor supply to 
secure the household’s income. The question is who in the household changes 
his or her time allocation along with the shocks. For example, if girls are 
more likely than boys to care for the sick at home, girls’ enrollment rate 
should be lower than that of boys even before the death of the ill family 
member(s).7 I use a sample of individuals aged 14–19 in 1998 irrespective of 
their enrollment status to check for ex ante responses.
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6 The estimation uses the joint distribution of the dependent variable conditional on the explan-
atory variables, the fixed component, and the sum of the dependent variable over time (in 
this case, 0, 1, and 2). The conditional distribution does not depend on the fixed component. I 
therefore do not estimate fixed effects in the conditional logit model.
7 If some household members (including school-age children) have already changed their time 
allocation as they anticipate the death of some adult members, it would not be necessary for 
other members to accommodate the negative impacts of adult death by making additional 
changes in time allocation decisions. This would lead to an underestimation of the impacts on 
labor supply and on schooling in our framework. We have not detected a causal link between 
enrollment in the initial period and the number of prime-age adult deaths in the following six 
years. In parts of the subsequent data analysis we examine the effect of future adult death 
(over a three-year time span) on initial-period enrollment by gender.  Although it is not possible in this data to identify whether a transition out 
of school is temporary, most adolescent transitions are a one-way process in 
our empirical setting. Though those who were recorded as participating in 
labor-force activities do not move back to school after the six-year interval 
covered by our panel data, the fact that I ignore the heterogeneity in the 
initial state causes a selectivity bias in the estimates. Therefore, I do not 
restrict the sample to those who were enrolled in school but also incorporate 
those already in the labor market in 1998. I also investigate how future mor-
tality affects the initial state. If household members anticipate the death, in 
the future, of a household member, they may adjust their behavior ex ante 
to accommodate for the negative shocks that arise ex post.8 Finally, in the 
analysis of adult labor supply, I focus on women’s time allocation between 
in-house and labor-market activities.
Activity Transitions
The KIDS surveys provide information about the activities of household mem-
bers by employment status; labor force status consists of three categories 
of employment (regular employment, casual or temporary employment, self-
employment) as well as unemployment. The KIDS data also specify whether 
an individual is unemployed, a “housewife  /  involved with child care,” in 
school (including at a university), at a crèche or preprimary school, retired, 
or “other.” The specifications are obtained from the respondents themselves. 
Although it is not possible to verify in the dataset whether the respondents are 
actively seeking employment, school enrollment and unemployment are mutu-
ally exclusive among the questionnaire options. Combining the two survey 
rounds, it is possible to establish the transitions in activity from 1998 to 2004, 
although details of activities within the intervening period are not available.
  Table 5.3 shows the activity transitions from 1998 to 2004 among adoles-
cents, that is, for those aged 14–19 in 1998.9 Two main trends emerge from 
the data. First, it is interesting to find that among those who transitioned 
to the labor market, the majority were unemployed in 2004. As discussed in 
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8 Given the survey interval of three years (1998–2004), my measurement of ex ante actions is not 
perfect in the sense that the 1998 data probably only captured ex ante actions for events 
that were occurring a few years ahead (say, 1998–2001). Similarly, ex post actions must have 
occurred before 2004 if events occurred immediately after 1998. However, the 2004 data are 
likely to capture these ex ante actions if they were not reversible.
9 In my empirical analysis, I target adolescents aged 14–19 in the initial period. Thus my results 
on schooling can be qualitatively different from those of other studies. In particular, I do not 
find that a mother’s death has a larger adverse impact on child schooling than a father’s death. 
I find that the death of working males has a large impact on adolescents’ schooling (labor sup-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Chapter 1, this tendency reflects current labor-market conditions in South
Africa, where the unemployment rate is high, particularly among the young. It 
is important to note that making the transition from school to the labor mar-
kets does not necessarily mean that individuals are employed in those markets. 
In the analysis that follows, I examine adolescents’ transitions from education 
to the labor force, including both employment and unemployment.
  Second, the transition from school to the labor force occurs in a relatively 
similar manner for both men and women. In South Africa gender gaps in 
schooling investment and in labor markets are relatively unimportant.
  The 1998 data contain seven adolescents whose activities were not classi-
fied as either labor market or school. Since the number of observations in this 
group is small, I decided not to show them in the table. The analysis in the 
next section also excludes this group, as inclusion of them in a multinomial 
logit analysis makes the estimation unstable. In the next section I provide 
empirical results on the impact of prime-age adult death on adolescents’ 
decisions to continue with schooling or to enter the labor market.
Empirical Results: Adolescent Transitions to Labor Markets
I use prime-age adult mortality as a measure of AIDS-induced mortality shocks 
to households in the analysis of adolescents’ transitions from school to labor 
markets. An alternative method is to use parental death. These choices are 
not exclusive, but they could shed light on different aspects of AIDS-related 
mortality.
  In our sample, I had 408 cases of prime-age adult mortality (defined for 
ages 15–64). Among the children aged 14–19 who were residing in the sample 
households in 1998, 43 children lost their mothers during the interval 1998–
2004, and 60 lost their fathers.10 The number of children who had already lost 
their parent(s) before 1998 is not included in these figures, so the number of 
orphans is greater. A total of 362 children experienced prime-age adult mortal-
ity in their households.11
  In this chapter, though I focus on the impacts of prime-age adult mortality, 
it is also interesting to examine the impacts of parental deaths and compare 
the results. As discussed in the previous section, the literature seems to 
confirm that a mother’s death has a significantly greater adverse impact on 
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10 The numbers of children who lost their mothers and fathers are 35 and 46, respectively, if 
we restrict the sample to ages 15–64.
11 During the period 1998–2004, 444 children experienced deaths in their households. Of these, 
125 children experienced the loss of working prime-age adults. There were 18 cases of deaths 
among the children aged 14–19. These cases are not included in the panel data, so we are 
examining the effects on other siblings. This sample is small relative to the total sample of chil-
dren aged 14–19.child schooling than a father’s death. This finding does not contradict the 
hypothesis that the death of a prime-age adult (especially one who is work-
ing, and thus contributing to household income) has a negative effect on child 
schooling. In fact I also confirm in this study that a mother’s death has an 
equal and significant negative impact on child schooling for boys and girls.
  In this section I detail the main findings on the impact of prime-age adult 
mortality on the time allocation of adolescents. In the analysis that follows, I 
use two different definitions of prime-age adults: those between the ages of 
20 and 64, and those between the ages of 20 and 44. The former corresponds 
mainly to the age range for labor force participation, while the latter focuses 
on the age range in which, as shown in the section “Mortality Change,” I found 
substantial increases in mortality rate.12 I consider a variety of measures 
of prime-age adult mortality—the total number of deaths in the household, 
prime-age adult deaths (ages 20–64 or 20–44), and deaths of working mem-
bers and of prime-age working adult members, differentiated by gender and 
occurring between 1998 and 2004—as explanatory variables. For the data, I do 
not capture deaths of members who moved out of the households.13 Instead, 
I include occurrences of death of new members who moved into the house-
holds, which have a relatively smaller effect on time allocation decisions. 
Mortality estimates could accordingly be biased in either direction.14
  Table 5.4 shows how prime-age adult mortality in the very near future, 
1998–2001, affects school enrollment in 1998, that is, ex ante. If future mor-
tality among prime-age adults in the household is preceded by the need for 
home care, additional incomes, or both, it may change the time allocation of 
adolescents.15 Since this analysis is cross-sectional, I include initial grade and 
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12 There are some reservations. First, although the age range 15–64 is a standard definition 
of members of a population in the labor force, we may potentially miss the effects of deaths 
among the elderly who were receiving pensions from the government. Second, as discussed 
subsequently, there were 18 children aged 14–19 (as of the 1998 survey) who died in the period 
1998–2004. I do not include these adolescents in the analysis, but the effects of their deaths on 
their siblings are included. Third, labor market employment among those aged 15 and 16 is rare, 
but since the focus of our analysis is on their transition to the labor market, whether or not 
they are employed is not directly relevant.
13 In the South African context, owing to the extensive use of migrant labor, it is often someone 
outside the household who takes responsibility for supporting child schooling. In this case, mortality 
in the household may not matter. In other words, we have strong evidence if we find a signifi-
cant negative effect on adolescents’ schooling.
14 Even though tracking individuals who moved away from survey sites was extensively attempted, 
it was necessary to drop from the analysis individuals who have died as well as those who could 
not be found. In considering the selectivity problem that may arise from mortality during the 
period, the results for adolescents aged 14–19 are robust to prime-age adult mortality in gen-
eral, and those for female adults are robust to prime-age male adult deaths.
15 Ainsworth, Beegle, and Koda (2005) and Yamano and Jayne (2005) conducted similar analyses 
on ex ante behavior. Our results largely confirm their findings.cluster (community) dummies and age to control observable heterogeneity, 
possibly determining schooling progression and transition to the labor market. 
Since in our sample all children under age 13 were enrolled in schools, I do 
not include those children.
  Column 1 includes deaths of prime-age (20–64) members and prime-age 
working members. In the preliminary analysis, I included mother’s and father’s 
deaths in 1998–2001, but the number of observations is so few that it was not 
feasible to estimate their effects. Adding both values to arrive at total parental 
deaths did not help estimate their effects.
  The prime-age (20–64) deaths on their own do not affect enrollment sig-
nificantly, but those of working members significantly decrease enrollment. 
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Table 5.4  Impact of future mortality on adolescent enrollment, 1998
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prime-age deaths (20–64 years)  0.1546  0.1653
 (0.50)  (0.53)
Prime-age working deaths (20–64 years)  –0.9943  –0.6800
 (2.02)  (1.06)
  × Male    –0.8699
   (1.19)
Prime-age deaths (20–44 years)      –0.6470  –0.2600
     (2.50)  (0.86)
  × Male        –1.0060
       (2.18)
Male prime-age deaths (20–44 years)          –0.0674  0.5184
         (0.19)  (1.17)
  ×  Male        –1.3810
        (2.30)
Female prime-age deaths (20–44 years)          –1.1911  –0.8935
         (3.35)  (1.91)
  ×  Male        –0.8477
        (1.31)
Number  of  observations  524 524 524 524 524 524
Pseudo R2  0.4291 0.4316 0.4313 0.4380 0.4417 0.4495
Sources:   University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of 
Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   The dependent variable equals one if the individual was in school in 1998 and zero otherwise. 
Probit estimation used. The numbers in parentheses are absolute z-values. Robust standard 
errors are used with household-level clusters. The sample uses individuals aged 14–19 years in 
1998, with the highest completed years of schooling strictly above zero. All specifications also 
include age in 1998; the value of durable goods in 1998; the number of household members 
in 1998 in age groups 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, 
55–59, 60–64, and 65 years or above who have lived more than 15 days in the household in 
the previous month; and both grade (1998) and cluster fixed effects. Except for cluster fixed 
effects, these variables are interacted with a male dummy. The specifications include parental 
deaths in 1998–2001, but the effect was not estimable because of the small incidences of paren-
tal deaths in the three-year period 1998–2001.Given a significant ex ante negative effect on enrollment of the future death 
of a working adult of prime age, I can conclude that male adolescents’ labor 
supply is likely to increase when the household income drops as a result of the 
death of a working adult. Column 2 adds the interaction of working prime-age 
deaths at ages 20–64 and a male adolescent dummy. However, I do not find 
any significant effects in this specification.
  In column 3 I use the prime-age definition of 20–44 years to account for 
the fact that this group has experienced significant excess mortality (see 
Table 5.1 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This measure is highly correlated with 
the death of working prime-age (20–64) members. The results in columns 1 
and 2 indicate that the deaths of working prime-age adults active at ages 
20–44, which cause a reduction of household income, have larger and more 
significant impacts on adolescents’ transition to labor markets.
  Column 4 disaggregates the prime-age (20–44) death effects by ado-
lescents’ gender. First, though the prime-age (20–44) adult deaths did not 
affect enrollment in general, we find that they significantly decreased males’ 
enrollment. However, the effect is significantly negative for male adoles-
cents. This finding suggests that male adolescents assume greater responsibil-
ity for supporting their households by moving from school to labor markets 
once a prime-age adult dies.
  In column 5 I consider deaths of male and female prime-age (20–44) 
household members separately. Interestingly, the effect of female deaths 
is significantly negative while that of male deaths is insignificant. I further 
decompose the effect by distinguishing between male and female adolescents 
(column 6). The deaths of male prime-age members significantly decrease 
male adolescents’ schooling, but not that of female adolescents. However, 
the deaths of female prime-age members decrease both male and female 
adolescents’ schooling (thus promoting their transition to labor markets).
  Since the analysis is cross-sectional, we cannot distinguish the preceding 
interpretation from the case in which these females live in households with 
certain characteristics that are more likely to result in an adult death (that is, 
poor households). To account for this, I included the value of durable goods 
(assets) in 1998 in the regressions.
  In this analysis I also tried to expand the sample by including younger 
children (age below 13) as part of the robustness checks, but since almost 
all children in this age range were enrolled in schools, this change does not 
improve the precision of the estimates.16
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16 On the high enrollment rate among African learners, see also Lam, Ardington, and Leibbrandt 
(2009).  Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger (2004) and Case and Ardington (2006) indi-
cate that male death is likely to occur in poor households. If so, large impacts 
of the death of working males have to be interpreted carefully. It is still pos-
sible that we pick up the effect of poverty on school dropouts.
  One important cause of girls’ decisions to drop out of school in South Africa 
is pregnancy. The question then arises of whether the probability of becoming 
pregnant during schooling is correlated with prime-age adult mortality in the 
household. For example, it is possible that poor families are more likely to 
have pregnant teenagers and face higher prime-age adult deaths than wealthy 
families. Again this factor was controlled for by including the value of durable 
goods in the household. However, it is possible for some households to have 
members with high biological fecundity (propensity to reproduce), which 
increases both the likelihood of teenage pregnancy and adult sexual activity 
(including extramarital sex), possibly leading to a higher incidence of HIV/
AIDS-related deaths. Another potential problem arises from a positive corre-
lation between a pregnancy shock (implying a negative shock to enrollment) 
and a prime-age adult mortality shock in the household. In the preceding 
cross-sectional analysis, data limitations make it hard to control the resulting 
potential downward bias. I was thus forced to set this problem aside.
  Next I analyze the transition of adolescents from school to the labor force 
using panel data for 1998–2004. Table 5.5 shows the relationship between 
age in 1998 and activity in 2004—whether or not an individual is in school 
(employed and unemployed). Interestingly, the transition to the labor market 
starts above ages 12–14 in 1998. In the preliminary analysis, I used a sample 
aged 7–13, but it was found that children aged 7–12 (in 1998) did not contribute 
to the estimation owing to a very small number of transitions. Therefore—as 
long as enrollment is used as a measure of schooling status, as opposed to 
more sophisticated measures, such as attendance, grade progression, and test 
scores—it is not feasible to identify the transition from school to nonschool 
status using younger children. Therefore I focus on adolescents (defined as 
those aged 14–19) in this study.
  Table 5.6 gives the estimation results for the conditional (fixed-effect) 
logit model.17 In this analysis I ignore other activities as an endogenous choice 
variable since the number of observations in this group is only seven for 1998 
(rendering the estimation unstable). In all specifications, I also include dum-
mies for maternal and paternal deaths.18
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17 Unobserved fecundity is controlled as fixed effects are eliminated in the conditional logit 
estimation.
18 I include parents in all ages, not restricting them to ages 15–64.  Column 1 includes the number of deaths among prime-age (20–64) house-
hold members, maternal deaths, and paternal deaths during the period 1998–
2004. First, deaths of prime-age members significantly increase adolescents’ 
transitions from school to labor markets. Second, deaths of a mother and a 
father both significantly increase such transitions.
  Column 2 includes the number of deaths among working prime-age house-
hold members during the period 1998–2004. Since the death of working prime-
age members is a subset of prime-age deaths, we look at the additional effect 
that the death of working members may have. There is no additional effect on 
adolescents’ transition from school to labor markets.
  In column 3 I interact the male adolescent indicator with the above-
prime-age adult mortality measures to check for gender differences in tran-
sition into the labor force. The column shows that an increase in the total 
number of working prime-age household members promotes a shift out of 
school into the labor force among adolescent males. The effect of prime-age 
deaths is significant without showing a gender difference. Mother’s death and 
father’s death continue to be highly significant.
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Table 5.5    Activity in 2004 by age in 1998
Age in 1998
(years)  School in 2004  Non-school in 2004  Total
6 168 1  169
7 182 1  183
8 160 2  162
9 144 4  148
10 171  6  177
11 118  8  126
12 165 25  190
13 137 60  197
14 80  58  138
15 52  76  128
16 36  69  105
17 24  104  128
18 16  93  109
19 9  103  112
20 12  98  110
21 1  85  86
22 2  112  114
23 0  114  114
24 2  99  101
25 2  104  106
Sources:   University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy 
Research Institute  /  University of Wisconsin–Madison 
(1998, 2004).  Columns 4 and 5 add the number of prime-age deaths using the age 
definition 20–44 years. The results show that while the death of prime-age 
members using ages 20–64 is insignificant, deaths among members aged 20–44 
significantly increases the transition of adolescents from school to labor mar-
kets. Interestingly, male adolescents are more likely than females to stop 
attending school when more economically active household members die 
(that is, those aged 20–44 and/or working and of prime age).
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Table 5.6  Impact of prime-age adult mortality on adolescent transition from 
school to labor market
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prime-age deaths 
    (20–64 years)  2.8709  3.2951  3.4267  1.2103  0.4379
  (4.01) (3.29) (3.38) (1.34) (0.36)
  × Male      –0.2792    1.5080
     (1.04)    (1.25)
Prime-age working deaths 
    (20–64 years)    –1.1591  –2.3317
   (0.76)  (1.48)
  × Male      16.712
     (13.15)
Prime-age deaths 
    (20–44 years)        2.8765  3.0571
       (2.87)  (3.04)
  ×   Male       11.493
       (11.41)
Male prime-age deaths 
    (20–64 years)            3.6413  2.7531
        (3.54)  (2.58)
  ×  Male         13.840
         (12.89)
Female prime-age deaths 
    (20–64 years)            2.3824  2.3214
        (3.16)  (3.15)
  ×  Male         0.1798
         (0.22)
Maternal  death  16.201 16.717 16.712 15.542 15.674 15.212  15.517
  (21.14) (21.89) (13.15) (21.77) (20.47) (20.47)  (21.06)
Paternal  death  16.263 17.245 16.663 16.422 16.797 14.843  15.147
  (30.25) (30.58) (26.15) (24.56) (17.81) (24.45)  (25.20)
Number  of  observations  754 754 754 754 754 754  754
Pseudo R2  0.3358 0.3381 0.3458 0.3489 0.3536 0.3384  0.3418
Sources:   University of KwaZulu-Natal  /  International Food Policy Research Institute  /  University of 
Wisconsin–Madison (1998, 2004).
Notes:   The dependent variable equals one if the individual was in the labor force in 2004 and zero if 
in school. Fixed-effect logit estimation used. The numbers in parentheses are absolute z-values. 
Robust standard errors are used with household-level clusters. Sample consists of those aged 
14–19 years in 1998.  In columns 6 and 7 I decompose prime-age deaths by gender. Both male 
and female prime-age deaths significantly increase the transition into the labor 
force. The effect is slightly larger with male prime-age deaths. The death of 
male prime-age members has a statistically larger effect on male adolescents.
  In summary, our results imply that it is more likely for male adolescents 
to enter the labor force when economically more active household members 
die—that is, males classified as of prime age (20–64), of prime age (20–44), 
or working and of prime age. This means that there is a substitution between 
male adolescents and economically active household members in their poten-
tial contribution to household income. Second, deaths of mothers and female 
prime-age household members affect both genders equally. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis posed earlier.
  Third, in all specifications, I found that mothers’ and fathers’ deaths 
both significantly increase adolescents’ entry into the labor markets. Quan-
titatively the impacts are much larger than that of prime-age adult deaths. 
The findings are largely consistent with evidence provided in the literature, 
but these results show that the effects of mothers’ and fathers’ deaths are 
nearly equal, while some previous studies report a larger effect of mothers’ 
deaths.
  The results in Tables 5.4 and 5.6 support the hypothesis that excess 
prime-age adult mortality in a society decreases the investment in human 
capital in the young population. I find decreased male and female schooling 
(increasing their entrance into the labor markets) before and after the death 
of prime-age adults and, more importantly, the death of parent(s).
Conclusion
My empirical results show that prime-age adult mortality has had an impact 
on adolescents’ transition from school to labor markets and on female labor 
supply decisions during the period 1998–2004. This six-year period coincided 
with an increase in prime-age adult mortality in South Africa.
  A few clear findings emerged from this research. The death of a prime-
age adult in the household, parent(s), or both significantly promotes ado-
lescent transition to the labor markets. Adolescents leave school in order 
to compensate for a possible loss of or reduction in household income, to 
smooth consumption, or to look after the household and its members. Male 
adolescent labor supply increases more when the death of working adults is 
anticipated in the very near future.
  These results suggest that excess mortality among prime-age adult causes 
a reduction of human capital investments at school as well as at home. Thus 
the AIDS epidemic has negative effects on the formation of human capital for 
the next generation, not only by disrupting child schooling, as many studies 
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ment among adolescents.
  Generally, in light of constrained household income owing to medical and 
funeral costs and limited access to formal arrangements (for example, credit) 
and to foster-care grants (see Meintjes et al. 2003 for South Africa), the well-
being of surviving household members, including orphans, remains a challenge. 
As the economy confronts an increased number of young people experiencing 
prime-age adult mortality in their households, this challenge will need to be 
addressed by the South African government and the society as a whole.
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History versus Expectations
T
he formation of human capital in the majority population of South 
Africa promises the alleviation of poverty and equitable economic 
growth. With the burden of its apartheid legacy, the country faces 
enormous challenges in transforming itself into an equitable society. Given 
the political difficulty of redistributing assets from the historically advan-
taged minority to the disadvantaged majority, the formation of human capi-
tal in the latter group can be a long-term solution to these challenges, as it 
builds new assets the poor can own and direct. However, the transformation 
of a society through the broad-based formation of human capital, especially 
among Africans, requires a relatively long time span.
  This monograph delivers two basic messages. First, though education is 
at the center of human capital formation, the dynamic aspects of human 
capital formation in individuals call for a wider perspective. Part 2 demon-
strated that human capital formation is dynamic in the sense that it starts in 
early childhood—even before childbirth. Malnutrition during early childhood 
owing to poverty reduces achievements at the schooling stage. Policy inter-
ventions aimed at enhancing healthy child growth (such as the current child 
support grants) are needed to guarantee the outcomes expected from the 
government’s effort to develop public school education. In South Africa the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic adversely affects schooling progress among adolescents, 
increasing their entry into the labor markets. Therefore, it is important to 
support households that are vulnerable to adverse shocks and protect chil-
dren from the negative impacts of such shocks.
  Second, as Part 1 showed, access to opportunities is still unequal across 
different segments of the society. Given the historical path the country has 
taken, it is important to guarantee equal opportunities for the formation of 
human capital to the African majority. In particular, relaxing financial con-
straints in formerly African schools and households is an urgent priority.
  Chapter 1 posed two questions regarding returns to schooling in South 
Africa: Why do returns to schooling differ across population groups? And why 
113do those returns show convexity—low returns up to high school, with signifi-
cantly positive returns at the completion of high school or at higher levels?
  It appears to me that an answer to the first question is related to differ-
ences in the quality of education available to different groups of the society. 
Part 1 showed that local resource constraints, reflected in school fees, poten-
tially limit the quality of education available in certain communities, though 
I also confirmed that government subsidies had relaxed those constraints. In 
this sense, it is interesting to observe that recent returns to schooling have 
been higher among the Indian/Asian population than among others. The labor 
markets still demonstrate whites’ advantage in accessing jobs with higher 
wages.
  The convexity question also seems to be related to the quality of education 
as well as the high unemployment rate in the South African labor markets. It 
is possible that labor demands that are biased in favor of a skilled labor force 
create rigidity in the demand-supply mismatch, concentrating unemployment 
among the less educated. The relatively low pass rate in matriculation at 
grade 12 exacerbates this problem.
  As our finding in Chapter 3 suggests, however, the progressive allocation 
of government budgets to schools, supported by the Norms and Standards for 
School Funding, is expected to improve the situation faced by historically 
disadvantaged schools and communities.
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Model for Chapters 2 and 3
I 
set up a simple static model of school finance and the demand for edu-
cators to confirm intuitions regarding the roles of liquidity constraints, 
government subsidy, and government coordination in the determination 
of LERs. Suppose there are a finite number of public schools under a govern-
ment, and that each school maximizes the per-learner output from educa-
tion, given its budget constraint, without government intervention. Assume 
that each school can employ educators freely and that the number of learners 
changes exogenously at each school, for example, owing to migration and 
population growth.
  Each school has a target LER in each period that maximizes the efficiency 
in education production, yit = y* + ξit, where ξit is independent and identically 
distributed with zero mean and finite variance. We assume that y* is small 
enough, and we ignore a negative range of yit.1 ξit could reflect transitory 
changes in school environments.
 Let  ei(Li, Hi) denote an efficienty function, where Li and Hi are learners 
and educators in school i, respectively. I assume the efficiency function takes
  Li a quadratic loss form: ei(Li, Hi) = [1 – (yit – ——  )2], where LER determines the
  Hi
learning efficiency.2 The total educational outcome is defined as ei(Li, Hi)Li. 
Each school has its static budget constraint, qiLi + GiwHi, where qi is the school 
fee, Gi is a subsidy from the government, w is the wage rate (exogenous) for 
educators, and Hi = Hi
s + Hi
u for two types of educators, subsidized and non-
subsidized, Hi
s and Hi
u, respectively. By definition, the budget constraint can 
be separated into two constraints: a government subsidy constraint, Gi ≥ wHi, 
and a school fee constraint, qiLi ≥ wHi
u. Nonsubsidized teachers are paid only 
from school fees. However, since the quality of subsidized and nonsubsidized 
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1 The optimal level of LER can change as endowment for and technology deployment in educa-
tion production vary across schools, if these factors alter the marginal productivity of educators. 
When other nonpersonnel inputs and LERs are substitutable, equal LERs are not necessary for 
equal education output.
2 In the range of LERs below the target, the efficiency is increasing in LER. It is assumed that 
with positive externalities among peer learners, an increase in number of learners raises the 
efficiency. However, if this effect is negligible, the target level can be set arbitrarily small.educators is the same in this framework, the two budget constraints can be 
added together. Assume that the government decides the per-learner amount 
of subsidy, gi, so Gi = giLi and gi ≥ 0 for all i (the government does not impose 
a tax).
  The school fee is bounded by some limit, qi
— — (f), determined by the socio-
economic circumstances, f, of the school. In particular, the fee is determined 
by income level and distribution.3 In fact, school fees are determined by SGBs 
consisting of educators and community leaders, such that most parents can 
afford to pay them. Unless the government subsidy gi offsets qi(f), local con-
  L dition f affects — —.
  H
  School maximizes the per-learner education output subject to the budget
constraint:
  Li  max  Etei(Li, Hi) = [1 – (yit – ——)2]   x,q   Hi
 s.t. 
  Gi ≥ wHi
s
  qiLi ≥ wHi
u.
Rearranging the budget constraint, we define φ(qi(f); w, gi):
  w  Li
  φ(qi; w, gi) ≡ ———————  ≤ ——.   (A.1)
  qi(f) + gi  Hi
The LER is constrained below by the ratio of educator wage (per-educator 
cost) to the sum of the school fee and the per-learner subsidy (per-learner 
revenue). When the school decides on the school fee and employs educators, 
the determination of the school fee is simple: qi*(f) = qi(f), that is, collect 
the highest school fees.4 In this model I assume that, at least in the short 
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3 For example, if community members vote for a school fee, we predict that the fee will be 
determined by the median community income.
4 Since 1996 school fees for public schools have been determined by the SGB, which consists of 
the principal, educators, parents (including community leaders), and sometimes learners at the 
secondary level. Therefore, the level of the school fee reflects opinions within the community. 
In community-school governance, the school fee increases as the median of monthly household 
income increases and as the standard deviation of monthly household income decreases. The 
former result is consistent with the voting implication, while the latter implies that school fee 
determination is anti-inequality. In this sense, school governance is altruistic to poor families 
who have difficulty in paying school fees, but it potentially sacrifices school quality (Yamauchi 
and Nishiyama 2005).run, the number of learners does not change immediately in response to an 
increase in school fees (that is, inelastic enrollment), but also that the fees 
are determined such that most parents can afford to pay them.5
  Suppose now that budget constraints are not binding. Then the optimal 
solution is





In this case Hi = β*Li, where β* = — —. Next consider the case in which the budget 
  y*
constraint is binding: y* < φ(q
—
i(f), gi; w). In this case:
 1













where w < β*(q
—
i(f) + gi). The second term is an efficiency loss in terms of the 
number of educators. The government will allocate the subsidies to those 
with binding budget constraints. Next consider the government’s allocation 
of school subsidies. Assume that the government maximizes the total educa-
tional output Σieili subject to its budget constraint but does not allocate any 
subsidy to those schools that are able to attain optimal ratios:
  w
  max     Σ     [1 – (y* – —— ————— ) 2]Li
  {gi}
i i|y*<φ(q
—i,0;w)  qi(f) + gi
 s.t.
  Σ      giLi ≤ G.
  i|y*<φ(q
—i,0;w)
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5 Yamauchi and Nishiyama (2005) show that the proportion of learners who cannot pay school 
fees, including both those who postpone payment and those who receive official exemptions, is 
positively correlated with the level of the school fees. The result, however, does not directly 
show the school drop-out rate. My interviews with school principals indicate that those parents   Without the government budget constratint, the necessary condition is 
gi* = wy* – qi
— —(f). In general we have 2[y* – φi(gi)][–φ′(gi)] = λ, where λ is the 
Lagrangian multiplier. From this we also know that when qi
——(f) decreases, 
gi increases to compensate for gaps in the capability of collecting school 
fees (community endowment). In other words, LERs are equalized under the 
benevolent government’s unitary decision.
  So, without government intervention, LERs are determined by school-level 
liquidity (budget) constraints, provided that the best ratio is identical in all 
schools no matter to which racial group they belong. However, we expect that 
with active government interventions, the ratios will be equalized across all 
schools. In particular, the subsidy is allocated more to those schools in less 
favorable socioeconomic circumstances, that is, those with larger initial LERs.
The 1998 Norms and Standards for School Funding
Sections that are relevant to this monograph are the following:
45. The SASA [South African School Act] imposes a responsibility on 
all public school governing bodies to do their utmost to improve the 
quality of education in their schools by raising additional resources to 
supplement those which the state provides from public funds (section 
36). All parents, but particularly those who are less poor or who have 
good incomes, are thereby encouraged to increase their own direct 
financial and other contributions to the quality of their children’s 
education in public schools. The act does not interfere unreasonably 
with parents’ discretion under the law as to how to spend their own 
resources on their children’s education.
46. Ironically, given the emphasis on redress and equity, the funding 
provisions of the Act appear to have worked thus far to the advantage 
of public schools patronized by middle-class and wealthy parents. The 
apartheid regime favored such communities with high-quality facili-
ties, equipment and resources. Vigorous fund-raising by parent bod-
ies, including commercial sponsorships and fee income, have enabled 
many such schools to add to their facilities, equipment and learning 
resources, and expand their range of cultural and sporting activities. 
Since 1995, when such schools have been required to down-size their 
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who cannot pay school fees are often required to provide services to the schools, such as clean-
ing the school facilities, but there is no systematic evidence suggesting that this is the norm in 
the country.
  In the empirical analysis, since we look only at the relationship between changes in number 
of learners and educators, we do not directly examine the effect of school fees.staff establishments, many have been able to recruit additional staff 
on governing body contracts, paid from the school fund.
47. Poor people, on the other hand, especially in former homeland areas, 
have contributed a disproportionate share of their incomes over many 
decades to their building, upkeep and improvement of schools, through 
school funds and other contributions, including physical labor. All too 
many schools in poor rural and urban working-class communities still 
suffer the legacy of large classes, deplorable physical conditions, and 
absence of learning resources, despite a major RDP National School Build-
ing Programme, and many other projects paid directly from provincial 
budgets. Yet the educators and learners in poor schools are expected to 
achieve the same levels of learning and teaching as their compatriots.
48. Such contractions within the same public school system reflect past 
discriminatory investment in schooling, and vast current disparities in 
the personal income of parents. The present document addresses these 
inequalities by establishing a sharply progressive state funding policy 
for ordinary public schools, which favors poor communities.
Model for Chapter 4
This section introduces a simple model in which parents decide how much to 
invest in child health and schooling, resulting in returns in the labor market. For 
simplicity, we treat the age distribution of children as exogenous and assume 
that children enter the labor market in the final stage. Health is formed in the 
first stage, while schooling investment is undertaken in the next stage.6
  In the pre-primary-school stage, per capita consumption determines 
health capital hj for child j, hj = f(c1, x) + εj1, where c1 is per capita consump-
tion in the household; x is predetermined community and household charac-
teristics, such as the availability of healthcare facilities and personnel and 
parents’ schooling; and εj1 is an idiosyncratic health shock. For simplicity, 
health capital accumulates only until age a*, when a child enters the school-
ing stage. The investment component f(c1, x) is characterized by the properties
  ∂f   ∂2f
——— > 0 and —— ——— > 0. For simplicity, I assume that c1 = y. Given that h is child
 ∂c1  ∂c1∂x
height, c is specifically intended to capture nutritional intake.
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6 Nutrition intakes until the age of 3 are regarded as very important in forming child health 
capital, measured by height-for-age z-score. Although weight-for-age z-score fluctuates over 
time (age) owing to changes in nutrition intakes (that is, consumption), height-for-age z-score 
is less likely to change after the age of 3. In the context of dynamic human capital production, 
therefore, child health is measured by the height-for-age z-score.  At the second stage, knowledge capital kj accumulates with schooling in-
vestments sj. The knowledge production function is given as
  kj = g(sj, hj, x) + εj2,
where investment g(sj2, hj, x) has health capital as its argument. Complemen-
  ∂2g
tarity between schooling and health investments is captured by ——— > 0. An
  ∂s∂h
implication of such complementarity (or substitutability) is that parents want 
to observe the outcome of health capital among their children in order to 
optimally decide schooling investments in the children. Owing to the sequen-
tial nature of human capital investment, parents can learn about the total 
outcomes of child human capital and their labor-market returns from the out-
comes of early-stage nutrition and health investments.7
  The household budget constraint in the second stage is
  c2 + pΣsj = y + Σw(hj)[T – sj] + b,
  j  j
where w(hj) is the opportunity cost of schooling (returns to health capital), 
T is the time endowment for the child, p is the school fee, b is savings and 
loans, and y is exogenous household income. It is assumed that the opportu-
nity costs increase with health capital, that is, w′(h) ≥ 0.8 Assume that the 
child cannot work at the pre-primary-school stage, and can work in the labor 
market only when he or she enters school.9
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7 Cunha et al. (2004) summarize some key concepts in the sequential development of child 
human capital. They focus on cognitive and noncognitive development. Their analysis does not 
directly include health and nutritional status as part of human capital in child development. 
The exclusion of health capital from the analysis results in a framework in which they can focus 
on human capital production function and the complementarity and substitutability of different 
inputs (for example, at the early-childhood and schooling stages). In this appendix, children are 
also considered as working in the labor market or participating in other activities where health 
capital has economic returns. This institutional setting creates implications that offset the 
health-schooling complementarity effect.
8 It is also important to note that the income opportunity in the child wage w(h) is not necessarily 
related to labor markets. It may also capture activities such as child care and self-employment.
9 Several qualifications follow. First, I assume that income from siblings, parents, and credit is 
pooled in the household budget constraint and is therefore perfectly substitutable. Second, to 
describe the income process, the model does not assume a production function in which adult and 
child members supply labor inputs that are not perfectly substitutable. This assumption is suitable 
in our empirical setting of South Africa, where wage employment (including formal and informal 
jobs) is a major source of income. Third, the utility function does not include leisure, which is 
imperfectly substitutable between household members (for example, Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990).  Parents maximize the objective function
 max  u(c2) + βEΣV(W(kj, hj) – (1 + r)bj),
  si,b  j
which captures the discounted sum of expected utilities from consumption 
over time and the final-period returns from children. Discount factor β has 
an interpretation of altruism to children, who have an increasing and concave 
utility function V. Assume that W(kj, h) = Rkkj + Rhhj, where Rk and Rh are 
financial returns to knowledge and health capital, respectively. In this ver-
sion, since we do not have uncertainty in the future returns to human capital, 
we omit the expectations operator. If the wage function is strictly concave, 
parents have incentives to equalize human capital among their children.
  The first-order conditions at the second stage are
  λ* = u′(c2*) = β(1 + r)V′(cj)
  ∂g
  {w(hj) + p} u′(c2*) = βV′(cj) ——— (sj, hj, x)Rk′,
  ∂sj
where λ* denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the stage 2 budget 
constraint. These conditions provide the schooling function k*(y, hj, x). At the 
first stage, the problem is trivial, since exogenous income and shocks deter-
mine investment in health capital. Therefore, with a perfect loan market, the 
effect of health on schooling depends on
  ∂sj*  ∂2g(sj, hj)
  ——— > 0 ⇔ ————————— Rk > w′(hj)(1 + r).
  ∂hj ∂ sj∂hj
  Preference and household income do not enter the condition. In this case, 
parents compare returns and opportunity costs for schooling. The important 
point is that child health capital can alter both returns and costs. If the 
opportunity cost does not increase with health capital (that is, w′(h) = 0), an 
increase in health capital will raise the optimal level of schooling if health 
and knowledge capital are complementary.
  In short, better health increases schooling, but it may also increase the 
probability that children are taken out of school to work either at home or in 
the market.
  Next consider the case in which b = 0, where credit opportunity is closed. 
Given the second-order condition, the effect of hj on sj depends on
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β ——— ——  RkV′(cj) + βV″(cj)Rk —— {
Rk —— + Rh}
 
  ∂sj∂hj  ∂sj  ∂hj 
  ∂u′(c2 *)
  ≥
< w′(hj)u′(c2 *) + {w(hj) + p} — ————   .
  ∂hj
There are four effects in this condition. First, the complementarity effect is 
summarized in the first term on the left-hand side, which increases school-
ing investment. Second, the concavity of the child utility function (that is, 
V″(cj) < 0) creates incentives to equalize the human capital outcomes and the 
future returns, which decreases schooling investment for children with greater 
health capital (the second term on the left-hand side). Parents are averse 
to sibling inequality. Third, an increase in health capital augments income 
opportunity outside school, which increases the opportunity cost of school-
ing investment (the first term on the right-hand side). Fourth, an increase in 
health capital also relaxes the household budget constraint, which weakens 
the necessity to work outside and increases schooling investment (the second 
term on the right-hand side). Whether or not health capital increases school-
ing investment depends on the magnitudes of these factors.
  It is easy to see the effect of other siblings’ health capital on schooling. 
In this case, we only have the budget-relaxing effect, and an increase of 
other siblings’ health capital always relaxes the household budget constraint, 
which increases schooling investment.10 Interestingly, however, the effect of 
other siblings’ health capital on schooling investment exists only when the 
financial market is imperfect. An exogenous improvement in other siblings’ 
health relaxes the budget constraint, which reduces the marginal utility λ*. 
If liquidity constraint is more likely to bind as the household income drops, 
the sibling effect is more likely to hold among poor households. This does not 
happen when the loan market is perfect.
  We have two other conjectures. First, in the case of the convex return 
function Rk, for which the second-order condition does not always hold, we 
expect some corner solutions. Parents can maximize welfare by investing in 
some children while ignoring others. When health capital is complementary 
to schooling investment, parents concentrate schooling investments in well-
endowed children, if the labor market wage is constant. However, greater 
health capital also raises opportunity costs, which decreases schooling invest-
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10 See Parrish and Willis (1993) for related evidence. See also Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
(2005) for birth-order effects on child education.ments. If the latter effect is sufficiently small, we expect that schooling inequal-
ity between siblings will diverge.11
  Second, suppose that children are born in different time periods. In the 
case of a small discount factor, parents may want to invest more in the school-
ing of older siblings, sacrificing the human capital for younger siblings, in order 
to gain returns to human capital as early as possible. If older siblings’ time 
input is important (included) in young siblings’ health capital production, older 
siblings can work at home to take care of younger siblings. In this case there is 
a trade-off between schooling investments in older siblings and time input in 
the health capital formation of younger siblings, which depends on the discount 
factor.12
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11 Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka (2003) present evidence from the rural Philippines, where 
boys are likely to inherit land, showing that parents invest more in the schooling of daughters  
than in that of sons, to equalize lifetime earnings between them. In the Philippines Schady 
(2003) and Yamauchi (2005a) both show that the schooling return function is convex; the latter 
contrasts this finding to the case of Thailand, where schooling returns are concave.
12 Nonneutrality of birth order and sibling’s sex composition in child human capital investment 
are pointed out and analyzed in, for example, Rosenzweig (1986), Butcher and Case (1994), 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005).References
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136  INDEXT
he end of the apartheid system in South Africa in 1994 brought with 
it the end of legally sanctioned racial segregation in schools. In practice, 
however, racial disparities in educational attainment continue, with 
white and Asian students outperforming the country’s African majority in 
school. Such a gap in achievement has a significant impact on the ability 
of Africans to get jobs and escape poverty. Human Capital Formation: History, 
Expectations, and Challenges in South Africa investigates the causes of 
South Africa’s persistent schooling imbalances, examining education laws 
and policies, as well as other influences on human capital investment. The 
study finds that inaccessibility of quality education, resulting from a lack 
of financial resources at both the local and household levels, is currently 
a significant constraint on educational attainment among the poor. This 
limitation will likely relax in the future as the government continues to 
subsidize schools, but the study also concludes that educational disparities 
cannot be overcome by direct attention to schools alone. For example, children 
require adequate nutrition at the pre-school stage in order to perform well in 
school. Furthermore, parental death or illness resulting from the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic can disrupt the education of adolescents, who might need to leave 
school to care for their parents or support their family. Steps to compensate 
for these problems, as well as improved access to schools, are necessary. 
These findings clarify the problems underlying inequalities in educational 
attainment, offering guidance to policymakers, development specialists, 
and others concerned with South Africa’s welfare.
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